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ANALYSIS

BY

LORD TENTERDEN

OF THE

PAPERS PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT

RESPECTING

CENTRAL ASIA,

1838-1878:

WITH AN

OUTLINE MAP SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL PLACES REFERRED TO.

Foreign Office,

November 30, 1878

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ANALYSIS
BY
LORD TENTERDEN
OF THE
PAPERS PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT
RESPECTING
CENTRAL ASIA.

PAPERS PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1839.

THE first series of papers respecting the affairs of Central Asia was presented to Parliament in 1839, under the title of "Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan." Their principal diplomatic interest consists in the attempt made by Russia to instigate Persia to undertake, under Russian protection, the conquest of Herat and of part of Afghanistan, and in the Russian Mission to Cabul which led to the war between England and Afghanistan in 1839.

In the early part of the century Russia had acquired the exclusive control of the Caspian Sea, and in 1836 had established great and almost paramount influence in Persia. The Persian Government laid claim to the sovereignty of Afghanistan as far as Ghizni, and was fully determined to attempt the conquest of Herat. Mr. Ellis, in reporting this from Tehran, 15th January, 1836, said: "The success of the Shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia, and their Minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution. The motive cannot be mistaken: Herat once annexed to Persia may become, according to the Commercial Treaty, the residence of a Russian Consular Agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan. Indeed, in the present state of the relations between Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied that the progress of the former in Afghanistan is tantamount to the advancement of the latter, and ought to receive every opposition from the British Government that the obligations of public faith will permit."

The Persians were unable to advance during 1836, their army being still at Asterabad and enduring the greatest privations; yet Mr. McNeill, who had succeeded Mr. Ellis at Tehran, reported, 3rd November, that the Russian Minister still continued to urge the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat. Lord Palmerston sent a copy of this despatch, 16th January, 1837, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, instructing him to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count Simonich was acting under his directions, and to point out how unwise and injurious were these military expeditions of the Shah.

Count Nesselrode stated that the Count had been distinctly ordered to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the present war at any time and in any circumstances, and his Excellency said that he was convinced that the British Minister had been misinformed, and that Count Simonich had never given any such advice to the Shah as that which had been attributed to him.

Notwithstanding these assurances Count Simonich continued to urge on the

war, and when the Persian army was before Herat in May 1838 he arrived at the camp, did his utmost to counteract the efforts of Mr. McNeill to bring about a peace, gave his advice as to the best manner of conducting the siege, employed a Russian officer of his suite to construct batteries and to carry on other offensive operations against the town, and furnished a sum of money to be given to the Persian soldiers. Moreover, Count Simonich had authorized a Treaty between the Shah and the Sirdar of Candahar bestowing the Principality of Herat on the Rulers of Candahar, with whom the Shah entered into a defensive alliance against the English or the Ameer of Cabul. This Treaty was to be guaranteed by the Russian Minister, and contained the provision that, "should Mohammed Shah fail to fulfil any of these several conditions, or depart in any way from the stipulations, I, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government, becoming myself responsible, will oblige him, in whatever way may be necessary, to act fully up to the terms and conditions of the Treaty."

In the meanwhile Captain Burnes had been sent to Cabul, but was met there by a Russian Captain Vikovitch, who succeeded in persuading the Ameer to rely on the good offices of the Czar, and Captain Burnes accordingly found his mission useless, and left Cabul in April 1838. (From Captain Burnes, 30th April, 1838.)

The efforts of the Russian Agents were brought to an end by the failure of the siege of Herat in June, the Russian soldiers being repulsed with the loss of their leader and a large number of men.

A diplomatic correspondence then ensued between the English and Russian Governments. On the 26th October, 1838, Lord Palmerston forwarded to Lord Clanricarde, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a draft note to be presented to Count Nesselrode. In this note the conduct of Count Simonich was reviewed and contrasted with the assurances given by the Russian Government. It further called attention to the action of Captain Vikovitch, and proceeded as follows:—

"It appears, then, from the foregoing statement, that on the last occasion when a communication took place between the Governments of Great Britain and of Russia upon the affairs of Persia, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg unequivocally disavowed having advised the Shah to make war; and asserted, on the contrary, that its instructions to the Russian Ambassador at Tehran were to dissuade that Sovereign from attacking Herat at any time and under any circumstances; but that, nevertheless, the Russian Ambassador in Persia has, during the whole period which has elapsed since the above-mentioned communication, strenuously exerted himself to encourage the Shah in his aggressive undertaking, and has contributed his own assistance, and that of other officers under his orders, to promote the success of the enterprise; and it appears, moreover, that although Her Majesty's Government was led to think from what fell from Count Nesselrode in a conversation which he had on this subject with the Earl of Durham on the 1st May, 1837, that Count Simonich "would not long remain in Persia," that Ambassador, nevertheless, has continued to remain in Persia, pursuing, with increased activity, and in the most open manner, the conduct of which his Government had expressed such decided disapprobation.

"It further appears from the foregoing statements, that whereas Russia has of late years invariably professed a desire to concert with Great Britain the course of policy which the two Governments should pursue with regard to Persia, so that the identity of their measures in that quarter might be a manifest proof of their friendship and union, Russian Agents in Persia and Afghanistan have lately been engaged in measures studiously concealed from the British Government, and planned in a spirit unfriendly to Great Britain, and for objects hostile to her interests.

"The British Government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue, with respect to the matters in question, whatever course may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the interests of Russia; and Great Britain is too conscious of her own strength, and too sensible of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates. But the British Government considers itself entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia and towards Great Britain are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofnikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vicovich? and the British Government thinks itself also justified in observing that if, from any cause whatever, the Russian Government has, subsequently to the months of February and May, 1837, altered the opinions which were then expressed to the Earl of Durham; and if that Government has, in consequence, thought fit to give to its Ambassador in Persia instructions diametrically opposite to those which were then described by Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofnikin, and which M. Rodofnikin offered to exhibit to the Earl of Durham, then, and in such case, the system of unreserved reciprocal communication upon Persian affairs, which of late years has been established between the two Governments, gave to the British Cabinet a good right to expect that so entire a change of policy on the part of Russia, together with the reasons on which it was founded, would have been made known to Her Majesty's Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, instead of being left to be inferred from the acts of Russian Agents in Persia and Afghanistan.

"The Undersigned, in conclusion, is instructed to say that Her Majesty's Government is persuaded that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg will see in this communication a fresh proof of the anxious desire

of the British Government to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations which so happily subsist between the two countries, and to which the British Government justly attaches so great a value; because explanations sought for with frankness and in a friendly spirit tend to remove misunderstandings, and to preserve harmony between nations."

Count Nesselrode replied, November 1, 1838—

"This consideration is so serious, it is calculated to have so pernicious an influence on all our relations with Great Britain, that we do not hesitate a single instant to meet the English Cabinet with a frank and spontaneous explanation, in order completely to remove its apprehensions as to the intentions and views of our Government with regard to the affairs of Asia.

"The policy, M. l'Ambassadeur, which the Emperor pursues in that quarter, is guided by the same principles which direct it in Europe. Far from any idea of encroachment, that policy has only for its object the maintenance of the rights of Russia, and respect for those legitimately acquired by all other Powers.

"The idea of assailing the security and the tranquillity of the state of possession of Great Britain in India has, consequently, never presented itself, and will never present itself, to the mind of our august master. He desires only what is just and what is possible. For this two-fold reason he cannot entertain any combination whatever directed against the British power in India. It would not be just, because nothing would have given cause for it. It would not be possible, by reason of the immense distance which separates us, the sacrifices which must be made, the difficulties which must be overcome, and all this, to realize an adventurous scheme which could never be in accordance with sound and reasonable policy. A single glance at the map ought to be sufficient to dissipate, in this respect, all prejudice, and to convince every impartial and enlightened man that no hostile design against England can direct the policy of our Cabinet in Asia."

He then explained the proceedings of Count Simonich as having been merely those of a friendly Representative who "did not think that he ought to refuse his assistance to the Shah when that Sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of the siege." M. Vickovitch was, he said, a commercial agent who had gone merely to "ascertain the advantages and the degree of security which commercial enterprises might offer to our merchants in a country hitherto unknown to Russia," and as the bearer of letters of courtesy in reply to those received from the Ameer. He added that Count Simonich was about to be recalled, and observed—

"Great Britain, like Russia, must have at heart the same interest, that of maintaining peace in the centre of Asia, and of avoiding the occurrence of a general conflagration in that vast portion of the globe. But, to prevent that great calamity, it is necessary carefully to maintain the tranquillity of the intermediate countries which separate the possessions of Russia from those of Great Britain. To consolidate the tranquillity of those countries; not to excite them against each other by nourishing their mutual animosities: to be contented with competing in industry, but not to engage in a struggle for political influence; finally, beyond everything else, to respect the *independence* of the intermediate countries which separate us; such is, in our opinion, the system which the two Cabinets have a common interest invariably to pursue, in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between two great Powers which, that they may remain friends, require not to touch each other, and not to come into collision with each other in the centre of Asia."

Lord Palmerston (December 20) "accepted as entirely satisfactory the declarations of the Imperial Cabinet, that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India; that its own policy with respect to Persia remains unchanged, and is the same which in 1834 the two Powers agreed to adopt (and which, I must be allowed to remind your Excellency, the British Government and its Agents in Persia have, from that time to this, undeviatingly pursued); and that in future the Russian Agents in Persia will unite themselves with those of Great Britain in earnestly dissuading the Shah from engaging again in any expedition similar to that which he has lately undertaken against Herat."

In a further note, 5th March, 1839, Count Nesselrode gave additional explanations as to Count Simonich's proceedings, and said that the Czar had refused to ratify the Treaty between Candahar and Persia, having disapproved the guarantee. He concluded by stating that—

"It rests now with the British Government to co-operate on its part towards this result, which is so necessary and so desirable. We can on this matter only refer to our preceding communications, and once more recall to the English Cabinet the wishes which we have expressed to it in our despatch of the 20th of last October.

"To re-establish promptly the relations of friendship between the Courts of London and of Telraun; to put an end to the hostile measures adopted in the Persian Gulf; to abstain from disturbing the tranquillity of the people of the centre of Asia by nourishing their animosities; to be contented

with competing in industry in those vast countries, but not to engage there in a struggle for political influence; to respect the independence of the intermediate countries which separate us; such is, we once again repeat it, the system which England and Russia have a common interest invariably to pursue in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between these two great Powers, which, that they may continue friends, require to remain each within its own limits, and not to advance against each other in the centre of Asia.

"We leave it to the enlightened judgment of the English Cabinet to weigh these reflections in its wisdom. It is too much interested itself in the preservation of the existing order of things not to be itself convinced that the tranquillity of Asia can only be ensured in a durable manner by a mutual agreement of pacific views and measures. It is important that there should be in this respect a complete reciprocity between the two Powers who exercise in common an influence over the destinies of that vast portion of the globe. We submit these considerations to the spirit of equity and of wisdom of the English Cabinet, congratulating ourselves that we offer to it the explanations contained in the present despatch, a fresh proof of our sentiments of conciliation and of frankness."

Although Count Simonich was thus recalled and Captain Vickovitch* disavowed, the result of their proceedings was to involve England in war with Afghanistan. In October 1838 the Viceroy of India issued a Proclamation denouncing the unfriendly conduct of the Ameer and declaring war against him. The British troops invaded Afghanistan in 1839, and invested Shah Soojah with the dignity of Ameer. In 1841 the Afghans rose under Akbar Khan and murdered Sir A. Burnes and Sir W. Macnaughten. In 1842 the massacre in the Khoord Pass occurred, followed by the renewal of the war and capture of Cabul by General Pollock.

RUSSIAN ADVANCES IN CENTRAL ASIA.

In order to render the Parliamentary Papers more intelligible, it may be useful to notice briefly the Russian advances in Central Asia.

In 1842 the Russians occupied the Island of Ashoorada in the Bay of Asterabad at the mouth of the Goorgan, having proceeded there to assist the Persians against the Turkomans. They have since occupied also Fort Chikislar, north of the mouth of the River Attek.

In 1847 they constructed Fort Aralsk on the Aral Sea, at the mouth of the Syr-Daria (Jaxartes), and thus firmly established themselves on that sea.

For many years they continued to advance to the south-east up the Syr-Daria.

In 1853 they advanced to Julak.

In 1864 they captured the town of Turkestan, and soon afterwards Chemkend from Khokand.

In 1865 they conquered Tashkend and in 1866 Khojand.

In 1868 they took Samarcand from Bokhara.

In 1873 they conquered and retained a portion of Khiva, and on the 28th September of the same year concluded a revised Treaty with Bokhara.

In 1875 they took possession of Khokand, and annexed it in 1876 to the Russian Empire.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW'S CIRCULAR OF 1864.

On the 21st November, 1864,† the Russian Government issued a Circular to their Representatives abroad explaining the position of Russia in Central Asia, which Prince Gortchakow stated was that of all civilized States "which are brought into contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization.

"In such cases it always happens that the more civilized State is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbours.

"First, there are raids and acts of pillage to be put down. To put a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission. This result once attained, these tribes take to more peaceful habits, but are in their turn exposed to the attacks of the more distant tribes.

"The State is bound to defend them against these depredations, and to punish those who commit them. Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically recurring expeditions against an enemy whom his social organization makes it

* He is believed to have committed suicide on his return to St. Petersburg.

† "Central Asia, No. 2 (1873)," Appendix.

impossible to seize. If, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is soon forgotten; its withdrawal is put down to weakness. It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet no hold upon them. The work has then always to be done over again from the beginning.

“In order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are established in the midst of these hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or less forced submission. But soon beyond this second line other still more distant tribes come in their turn to threaten the same dangers and necessitate the same measures of repression. The State thus finds itself forced to choose one of two alternatives: either to give up this endless labour and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, rendering all prosperity, all security, all civilization an impossibility, or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expenses increase with every step in advance.”

Prince Gortchakow then remarks that the Imperial Government found itself in the dilemma of either permitting the continuance of a state of permanent disorder or of entering upon the undefined path of conquest and annexation which has given to England the Empire of India. Neither of these alternatives was in accordance with the Emperor's policy, and the following principles had, in consequence, been laid down:—

“1. It has been judged to be indispensable that our two fortified frontier lines—one extending from China to the Lake Issyk-Kaul, the other from the Sea of Aral along the Syr-Daria—should be united by fortified points, so that all our posts should be in a position of mutual support, leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes might make with impunity their inroads and depredations.

“2. It was essential that the line of our advanced forts thus completed should be situated in a country fertile enough, not only to insure their supplies, but also to facilitate the regular colonization, which alone can prepare a future of stability and prosperity for the occupied country, by gaining over the neighbouring populations to civilized life.

“3, and lastly. It was urgent to lay down this line definitively, so as to escape the danger of being carried away, as is almost inevitable, by a series of repressive measures and reprisals, into an unlimited extension of territory.”

Prince Gortchakow adds—

“In spite of our unwillingness to extend our frontier, these motives had been powerful enough to induce the Imperial Government to establish this line between Lake Issyk-Kaul and the Syr-Daria, by fortifying the town of Tchemkend, lately occupied by us. By the adoption of this line we obtain a double result. In the first place, the country it takes in is fertile, well-wooded, and watered by numerous water-courses; it is partly inhabited by various Khirgeeze tribes, which have already accepted our rule; it consequently offers favourable conditions for colonization, and the supply of provisions to our garrisons. In the second place, it puts us in the immediate neighbourhood of the agricultural and commercial populations of Khokand. We find ourselves in presence of a more solid and compact, less unsettled, and better organized social state; fixing for us with geographical precision the limit up to which we are bound to advance, and at which we must halt, because while, on the one hand, any further extension of our rule, meeting, as it would, no longer with unstable communities, such as the nomad tribes, but with more regularly constituted States, would entail considerable exertions, and would draw us on from annexation to annexation with unforeseen complications. On the other, with such States for our future neighbours, their backward civilization, and the instability of their political condition, do not shut us out from the hope that the day may come when regular relations may, to the advantage of both parties, take the place of the permanent troubles which have, up to the present moment, paralyzed all progress in those countries.”

CORRESPONDENCE IN 1865.

Proposal for Exchange of Declarations with Russia.

In order to deal with the correspondence in historical sequence, the communications which were exchanged between the English and Russian Governments in 1865 must now be referred to, although the Papers are only now being presented to Parliament. (Appendix, Central Asia No. 1, 1878).

This correspondence arose out of an article published in the “*Journal de St. Pétersbourg*” (page 167), commenting on some observations made by Sir R. Murchison with reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia in an address to the Royal Geographical Society in May 1865, in which he treated the idea of an invasion of India from the Russian possessions in Central Asia as a pure chimera and a physical impossibility.

In reply to Mr. Lumley's despatch inclosing this article, Lord Russell wrote a despatch to him, 31st July, 1865 (page 170), in which he stated—

"I have to observe that Her Majesty's Government share completely the sentiments of Sir R. Murchison, and are glad to think that the article in the 'Journal de St. Pétersbourg' of the 1st July expresses those of the Russian Government.

"Still there are circumstances in the present situation of the British and Russian Empires which might give rise to anxiety, and Her Majesty's Government being fully persuaded of the friendly and pacific sentiments of the Emperor of Russia are desirous to remove every cause of danger which might threaten the future good understanding of England and Russia.

"Her Majesty's Government consider it would be useful for this end if the two Powers were to make friendly explanations to each other, based on the present state of affairs.

"Her Majesty's Government, on their part, are determined to respect the present state of possession in Central Asia. Her Majesty's Government will also respect the independence of the Persian Monarchy, will be careful not to encroach upon the territory of Persia, and will act in such a manner as may best support and strengthen the sovereignty of the Shah.

"If His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will be prepared to make analogous declarations, Her Majesty's Government think that, without the formality of a Convention, an exchange of notes might take place which would tend to settle the minds of the inhabitants of Central Asia, and prevent misunderstandings, thereby affording a fresh security for the maintenance of peace between the two Empires."

Prince Gortchakow, upon this despatch being communicated to him, said that he did not exactly understand what object Lord Russell had in view in desiring this interchange of declarations; as a practical man, he did not see what was to be gained by it; as regarded the policy of Russia in Central Asia, the Emperor's views had been publicly announced, and even published; they were to the effect that Russia desired no extension of territory in that country; what she did desire was a peaceful and settled state of affairs on her Turkestan frontier, such as would enable her to open a safe road for commerce to Kashgar, not for Russia alone, but for the whole world.

There would be no difficulty, Prince Gortchakow continued, in making such a statement as that proposed by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the present state of possession in Central Asia, were it not for the behaviour of the Khan of Bokhara, who had already entered and taken possession of some portion of the territory of Khokand; an intimation of a hostile nature had also been received by General Tcherniaeff from the Khan of Bokhara, and it was difficult to say what might arise from the action of the barbarous leaders of the hordes of Bokhara, who seemed prepared to overrun the neighbouring Khanate. This Russia could never tolerate, and measures had been taken, by laying an embargo on the trade of Bokhara, which it was hoped would have the effect of compelling the Ameer to withdraw from the territory of Khokand.

With regard to Lord Russell's declaration that Her Majesty's Government would respect the independence and territory of Persia and uphold the sovereignty of the Shah, his Excellency said he could not understand the connection between Central Asia and the Persian Monarchy which had induced his Lordship to make this declaration.

The declaration itself was of a very satisfactory nature, and one which was quite in accordance with the views of the Imperial Government, but, while receiving it with pleasure, he must say that he had never suspected Her Majesty's Government of any intention of encroaching upon the territory of the Shah. (Page 172.)

Prince Gortchakow sent a formal answer on the 5th August to Baron Brunnow (page 174) instructing him to repeat the assurance that the Russian Government had in Central Asia no other interest than that of repose, of the security of the Russian frontiers, and of the establishment of commercial and pacific relations with their neighbours, by which Russia would not profit alone.

Lord Russell rejoined on the 16th September—

"These assurances are satisfactory, but it would have given Her Majesty's Government still greater confidence if Prince Gortchakow had replied to the declaration of the views of Her Majesty's Government by a similar declaration.

"Her Majesty's Government, however, are willing to accept the explanation of the principles which guide the policy of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, contained in the Circular already referred to, and are quite ready to believe that legitimate desires for the extension of commerce and the security of the Russian frontiers, and no wish for territorial aggrandizement, guide the proceedings of the Government of Russia.

"Such an extension of commerce, and the security of the Russian frontiers, will no doubt tend to the advantage of other nations who carry on trade with Central Asia, and of none more than Great Britain." (Page 175).

Sir Andrew Buchanan, who had arrived at St. Petersburg at the beginning of September, took an opportunity of pointing out to Prince Gortchakow the omission in his despatch to Baron Brunnow of any mention of Persia. His Highness answered that he could not believe that an unfavourable interpretation would be given to that omission, as it was impossible for any one acquainted with the policy of the Imperial Government to suspect it of designs against the independence of the Persian Monarchy, and as he had, therefore, considered Lord Russell's reference to Persia merely intended to give to the Russian Government the same assurances on the part of Her Majesty's Government, with respect to that Asiatic State, which they wished to receive from them respecting the Khanates of Central Asia, he had considered it unnecessary to instruct Baron Brunnow to speak of the policy of the Emperor with regard to Persia, because Her Majesty's Government could not doubt the desire of His Imperial Majesty to promote the independence and prosperity of that Monarchy. (Page 175.)

At an interview with the Emperor of Russia His Majesty stated to Sir A. Buchanan that he might assure Lord Russell that his Government had no ambitious designs in that quarter of the world, and that their language on the subject was entirely free from reservation or "arrières pensées."

His Majesty said that his Empire was already sufficiently large, and that his sole policy in Central Asia was to encourage commerce and civilization. But that in following this object, it was of course impossible to prevent collisions occurring from time to time between his troops and the inhabitants of these distant and barbarous countries.

His Majesty held much the same language to Sir A. Buchanan as Prince Gortchakow, and he also explained in the same manner the omission of any reference in the Prince's despatch to the policy of Russia with respect to Persia. (Page 177.)

On the 11th October Sir A. Buchanan reported—

"Prince Gortchakow will dispatch a messenger to London to-morrow, who will be the bearer of instructions to Baron Brunnow on the subject of the policy of Russia with respect to Central Asia and to Persia, which will, I trust, prove satisfactory to your Lordship and to Her Majesty's Government.

"Although the form of Prince Gortchakow's declaration is not so formal and binding as that which your Lordship invited, it, at all events, gives an assurance that Russia has only commercial objects in Central Asia, and that she will respect the independence of Afghanistan, and that, in common with Great Britain, she will support the Persian Monarchy.

"Under present circumstances this assurance may, I presume, be considered satisfactory; and with regard to the eventualities of the distant future, it would perhaps be rash to expect that any declaration, however honest and however formal, Prince Gortchakow might give, would indefinitely restrain this nation from seeking to follow out what many Russians are believed to consider the mission of Russia in the East.

"In speaking to me on the subject his Excellency said that Baron Brunnow cannot declare too positively to Lord Russell that all the Russian Government seek in Central Asia is to establish secure caravan routes towards the East, and that with respect to their present measures, they consider it necessary, in order to effect this, that Khokand and Tashkend shall be assisted to maintain their independence of Bokhara." (Page 178.)

Russian Proceedings in Central Asia.

On the 19th July, 1865, Mr. Lumley asked M. de Westmann what truth there was in a report which had reached him that the Russian army in the desert of Khokand was preparing to advance to Kaskgar and Yarkand.

M. de Westmann said he should be greatly surprised to learn that any such movement was in contemplation; without having a full knowledge of the details of what was going on in Central Asia, he was sufficiently acquainted with the salient features of the policy of his Government in that country to state that such a movement would be in direct contradiction with the views of the Emperor. Any further advance in that direction would necessitate very great expense without any corresponding advantage. (Page 170.)

On the 21st July Mr. Lumley spoke to M. Stremouchoff with respect to the report of a Treaty having been concluded between Russia and Bokhara. M. Stremouchoff replied that Russia knew too well how unsatisfactory it was to have dealings with the Khans of Central Asia to think of concluding a Treaty with the Ameer of Bokhara for that or for any other purpose; it was worse than useless to enter into engagements with a barbarian who was certain to break them as soon as it suited

his convenience, and who could not be punished for his breach of faith witho t great inconvenience and expense.

Nevertheless, he said, Russia is naturally desirous of turning to the best advantage the progress she has made in Central Asia. A regular post route is now opened to the furthest point occupied by the Russian troops, and the new Governor-General of Arenburg, General Kryjanovsky, has been instructed to conclude certain arrangements with the Ameer of Bokhara for the benefit of the commerce of the two countries, and if the Ameer did not agree to these regulations or infringed them, the Russian Government had the means of making him amenable to reason by stopping his trade.

M. Stremouchoff stated further that the Russian Government hoped, at no distant period, without occupying Tashkend, to make that place the great entrepôt for Russian commerce with Central Asia. (Page 171.)

On the 5th August Prince Gortchakow wrote to Baron Brunnow that the Ameer of Bokhara had for a long time had designs on Khokand and Tashkend, and that his troops were advancing in two directions; his Commander had also addressed General Tchernaiëff in an insolent manner. The Russian Government could not tolerate such language or the pretensions of the Ameer, and, if he persisted, a conflict would be inevitable, although the incident would not modify the determination of the Emperor to abstain from useless conquests. (Page 173.)

On the 12th September Prince Gortchakow informed Sir A. Buchanan that the measures adopted against the commerce of Bokhara had induced the Khan to suspend his military operations in Khokand and to offer to send a Diplomatic Agent to St. Petersburg. It was also the intention of the Imperial Government to insist on the Bokharian troops being withdrawn from the Khokandese territory, and on Tashkend being declared an independent town.

In answer to Sir A. Buchanan's inquiries His Highness stated that the towns of Khokand and Kodjend were now occupied by the Bokharians, whose forces were represented to amount to 40,000 men, which was, doubtless, he said, an exaggerated statement, while those of Russia in Turkestan did not exceed 5,000 men.

Sir A. Buchanan then asked whether Russia had at present a factory or a Consul at Kashgar or Yarkand, and his Excellency replied he believed not. He said he personally disapproved of establishing permanent commercial agents in these remote and barbarous countries, and he had therefore opposed a proposal to sent a Consul to Bokhara, on the ground that such an Agent would not be safe without a regiment to protect him.

It was, therefore, more expedient, he added, that the Chiefs of the caravans which periodically traversed these countries should be themselves the ordinary organs of communication with the local authorities. (Page 177.)

On the 9th October Sir A. Buchanan reported that he learned from Prince Gortchakow that the Governor-General of Orenburg was then at Tashkend, and that he was instructed to confer there with the Bokharian Envoy whom the Khan had proposed to send to St. Petersburg. (Page 177.)

The reason of the Russian General being at Tashkend was that, notwithstanding the views expressed by M. Stremouchoff in July, the Russian forces, after a siege of a month, had entered the town on the 23rd June, and by a Proclamation on the following day declared the territory of Tashkend annexed to the Russian Empire.

PAPERS PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1873 AND 1874.

This series of Papers contains the correspondence between the British and Russian Governments with regard to the proposal for a neutral zone between the Asiatic possessions of the two countries, the boundary of Afghanistan, and the assurance given by Count Schouvaloff with regard to Khiva.

In order fully to understand this correspondence it is necessary to bear in mind the condition of affairs with regard to the Russian advances in Central Asia at the date, March 1869, at which it commences.

In May 1868 the Russians had occupied Samarcand and entered into Treaties with Khokand and Bokhara,* by which the Russian conquests made during the preceding two years were confirmed. The relations thus established with Bokhara raised the question of the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, between which country

* One of the results of the Treaty with Bokhara was to extend the Russian prohibitory Tariff to this part of Central Asia, thus excluding all trade in goods with British India, with the exception of indigo and muslin.

and Bokhara there were long-standing disputes, the distance from Bokhara to Balkh being 290 miles, and the River Oxus running through both States.

It is necessary to distinguish this question of the boundary between Afghanistan and Bokhara from that which soon afterwards arose as to the advance of Russia upon Khiva, and the reported intentions of the Russians to advance from the Caspian upon Merv, thus threatening the security of Herat, from which it is stated to be only ten marches distant.

In order to elucidate these questions of frontier as connected with the Russian advances, an outline map is annexed to this Analysis showing the principal places referred to in the correspondence laid before Parliament.

The first part of the Papers presented in 1873 (Central Asia No. 2, 1873) is occupied by the correspondence of Lord Clarendon with the Russian Government respecting a proposal for establishing a neutral zone.

Proposals for a Neutral Zone. Affairs of Bokhara and Afghanistan.

On the 27th March, 1869, Lord Clarendon (page 1) addressed a despatch to Sir Andrew Buchanan stating that he had earnestly recommended to Baron Brunnow the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which would be the limit of those possessions, and be scrupulously respected by both Powers, and inclosing a copy of a letter from Prince Gortchakow to Baron Brunnow, giving a positive assurance that Afghanistan would be considered as entirely beyond the sphere in which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence.

In this letter Prince Gortchakow said that—

“The idea expressed by Lord Clarendon of keeping a zone between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia, to preserve them from any contact, has always been shared by our august Master. You may assure Lord Clarendon that nothing could better suit the views of the Emperor.

“As to the zone which separates the Asiatic possessions of the two countries, and in which their respective influences might eventually clash, it is plain enough that both Powers are in identically the same position. For both Governments the possible advantages of an extension of territory diminish in proportion to the distance, and in all annexation there is a limit imposed by nature, beyond which any advance will lead to difficulties, and even to danger.

“We have done full justice to the profound wisdom of the arguments brought forward by Sir J. Lawrence in favour of a policy of abstention with regard to Afghanistan. For our part, we feel no apprehension as to the ambitious projects of England in Central Asia, and we have a right to expect the same confidence to be shown in our good sense.

“You may then, my dear Baron, repeat to Her Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence. No intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into his intentions.

“If the Cabinet of London is, as we hope, animated by the same convictions, the wishes of Lord Clarendon would be realized: our respective possessions in Asia would be separated by an independent zone which would preserve them from any immediate contact, and the two countries could, in all security, devote themselves to the accomplishment of their mission of civilization, each in her natural sphere, even lending, it may be, one to the other that assistance which is the natural consequence in our days of the universal diffusion of intelligence and progress.”

On the 17th April Lord Clarendon told Baron Brunnow—

“that the Secretary of State for India, having consulted those members of his Council who were well acquainted with the countries in question, had arrived at a decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory that it was the object of the two Governments to establish, as the frontiers were ill-defined; and if the Russian forces advanced to those frontiers disputes with the Chiefs on the border would sooner or later but infallibly ensue, and Russia might be compelled, however unwillingly, to disregard the arrangement she had entered into, and it was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus, which was south of Bokhara, should be the boundary line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross.”

Baron Brunnow observed that, as Khiva was south of the Oxus, such an arrangement might encourage the Khan in a hostile attitude towards Russia. Lord Clarendon replied that, should the necessity arrive for punishing the Khan on his own territory, Her Majesty’s Government would rely upon the honour of Russia, as soon as she had obtained reparation, again to revert to the arrangement, should she have assented to it, and consider the Upper Oxus as the boundary which was not to be passed. (Page 4.)

Some further communications took place as to the respective rights of Khiva and Bokhara over the territory south of the Oxus, and the Emperor of Russia mentioned to Sir A. Buchanan (page 7) that he feared there was a disposition on the part of the Government of India to encourage the ambitious views of the Ameer of Cabul, who was said to contemplate the conquest of Bokhara.

In September Lord Clarendon had a conference with Prince Gortchakow at Heidelberg, and pointed out to the Prince (page 9)—

“the various acquisitions of Russia, and the dates at which they were made, adding that, Russia being now in possession of Samarcand, Bokhara was completely in her power, to which his Excellency assented; and that the next step onwards would probably be to Balkh, which could be of no use to Russia except for purposes of aggression; and that on the Hindoo Koosh the British possessions might be viewed as a traveller on the summit of the Simplon might survey the plains of Italy, and that measures for our own protection might then become necessary. As regarded apprehensions of invasion, however, we had none, as it was impossible for a Russian army of 50,000 men to cross that mountainous country at a vast distance from its basis of operations in order to meet, not the semi-barbarian hordes that had been easily conquered in Central Asia, but a regular army as numerous and well-organized as the Russian, with all its resources at hand—the only apprehension we had was, I continued, that the nearer approach of the Russians, and intrigues with native Chiefs, might keep the Indian mind in a ferment, and entail upon us much trouble and expense, all of which would be avoided by a clear understanding with the Russian Government, by which a neutral ground between the possessions of the two countries might be established.”

Prince Gortchakow said that Lord Clarendon—

“was right in thinking that Bokhara might at any moment be taken, because it depended for its supply of water upon Samarcand, which was in the possession of Russia, but that it was the intention of the Emperor not to retain Samarcand, and he could give no better proof of His Majesty's determination not to proceed further southwards; certain arrangements had to be made and were not yet completed with the Ameer of Bokhara. It was the intention, however, of the Russian Government to demand 1,000,000 roubles for the expenses of the war, and to allow ample time for payment, about which no difficulty was anticipated, as the revenue of Samarcand was 300,000 roubles per annum.”

The despatch to Sir A. Buchanan, which records this conversation, proceeds as follows:—

“I then alluded to a misapprehension which I believed to exist in his Excellency's mind respecting the assistance given to Shere Ali by England with intentions hostile to Russia, and I explained that the policy was not of recent date, and had originated with Lord Lawrence, that it had no reference to the advances of Russia in Central Asia, and had solely for its object to enable Shere Ali to maintain that order in Afghanistan which was of importance to the neighbouring possessions of Great Britain.

“I then told Prince Gortchakow that, since I left England, I had received the copy of a letter from the Governor-General in Council, stating that nothing had occurred which could justify a belief that the Ameer entertained any aggressive intentions on neighbouring States, or for a military advance beyond his own frontier in any direction whatever; and that, should he ever display such intentions, it would be the duty of the Indian Government strongly to remonstrate against a course so dangerous to himself, and so contrary to the course of policy which was inculcated at Umballa, and which he assured the Governor-General he was anxious to pursue.

“Prince Gortchakow declared that this was quite sufficient and most satisfactory, and that he should have great pleasure in forthwith reporting it to the Emperor.

“I next alluded to the Oxus as forming the most desirable line of demarcation for a neutral ground between the Russian and British possessions, but Prince Gortchakow expressed a hope that I should not press it, as a portion of country south of the Oxus was claimed by the Ameer of Bokhara; and, as it might lead to differences between the Russian and English Governments, he preferred that Afghanistan should be looked upon as constituting the neutral ground which it was expedient to establish.

“I remarked upon this that the frontier of Afghanistan was ill-defined, and that the Ameer might attempt to bring under subjection the different Khanates which had formerly belonged to Afghanistan, and which I believe were now considered by Russia to be quite independent.

“To this Prince Gortchakow replied that the Ameer was at perfect liberty to do so, and that no complaint would be made provided he did not attack the Ameer of Bokhara, or pursue a course of policy that might reasonably be considered aggressive against Russia.”

In October and November 1863 Mr. Douglas Forsyth was at St. Petersburg, and held various conversations with the Chief Ministers of State regarding the interests of England and Russia in Central Asia.

On the 30th October (page 13) he gave to Prince Gortchakow for perusal a letter from Lord Mayo, expressing his earnest desire that the most complete *entente cordiale* should be maintained between Russia and England in Asia.

Mr. Forsyth's report of this interview (page 13) states—

“ His Excellency entirely reciprocated Lord Mayo’s opinion regarding the inadvisability of sending any officer, either English or Russian, to Afghanistan.

“ His Excellency expressed himself much satisfied with Lord Mayo’s assurances, as well as by the assurances given by Lord Clarendon, that the policy pursued in India would be in entire consonance with the wishes of Her Majesty’s Government in India.

“ In like manner it was to be understood that the policy enunciated at St. Petersburg was that which ruled the actions of all Russian officers in the remotest parts of the Empire, and if different interpretations were put forth by Consuls or Agents in other parts, they were to be treated as mist which should be blown away.

“ General de Miliutine and M. de Stremouchoff entered fully into the question of maintaining the independence of the States which intervene between Russia and India. M. Stremouchoff very ably explained the idea of a neutral zone, which would include such tracts as Balkh and Koonduz and Badakshan, but seeing that these provinces have become, for periods more or less long, incorporated with Afghanistan, it was the opinion of General Miliutine, concurred in by M. Stremouchoff, that we should accept as Afghanistan all the provinces which Shere Ali now holds. Beyond this limit he should not attempt to exercise any interference or influence, and the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression.

“ Similarly, Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.”

At a further interview Mr. Forsyth had some conversation (page 15) with M. Stremouchoff regarding the political position of Badakshan. This was the commencement of a discussion on the boundary of Afghanistan, which subsequently formed the basis for the settlement eventually arrived at after the proposal of a neutral zone had been dropped. The Russians maintained that Badakshan and Wakhan were independent of Shere Ali, while the Indian Government held that these districts had formed part of the territories of Dost Mahomed and were still subject to his son.

In January 1870 (page 26) Lord Clarendon, at the request of the India Office, addressed a representation to the Russian Government urging that they should use their influence to restrain the Ruler of Bokhara from an attack which he was said to be contemplating on Afghanistan, and pointing out that, if the Indian Government dissuaded the Ameer of Cabul from aggression, it was just that the Russian Government should exercise a similar influence at Bokhara. The Russian Government replied (page 28) that this policy was exactly what they desired and were endeavouring to establish.

It soon afterwards appeared (page 33) that the differences between Afghanistan and Bokhara were in a fair way of being arranged. They had arisen from the asylum given at Bokhara to Abdul Rahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, and claimant to the Afghan throne. His name frequently occurs in the correspondence as being subsequently a Russian pensioner at Samarcand, Tashkend, and elsewhere (pp. 40, 41, 43, 49, 50, 54).

On the 1st June Sir A. Buchanan stated (page 24) that he had been informed by Prince Gortchakow with respect to Bokhara that the Ameer had not yet paid the war indemnity which he owed to Russia, amounting, it was said, to 200,000 or 300,000 roubles, and that he understood that the Emperor told the Bokhara Envoys before they left St. Petersburg that until this engagement was punctually fulfilled the Ameer must not expect that negotiations would be entered into with him for the evacuation of Samarcand.

On the 18th June Sir A. Buchanan transmitted a translation of a letter addressed by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Cabul as follows:—

“ Tashkend, March 30, 1870.

“ You have probably learnt already that your nephew, Abdul Rahman Khan, formerly Governor of Balkh and of other cities of Afghanistan, came lately to Tashkend, and that I, as the Representative of my august Master and Sovereign, received him with honour and cordiality. Being anxious that you should not take umbrage at the stay of the Sirdar of Afghanistan at Tashkend, I have considered it advisable to address this letter to you in order to set before you truthfully and frankly my views with regard to the relations existing between Russian Turkestan and Afghanistan, and to make you acquainted with the principles by which I am guided in my intercourse with you.

“ The Czar’s possessions in Turkestan do not border on the countries at present under your rule: we are separated by the Khanate of Bokhara, whose Ameer, Seid Mouzaffar, has concluded a peace with Russia, and is at present friendly towards and under the protection of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias. No collision or misunderstanding can therefore take place between us, though we are distant neighbours, and we can and ought to live in peace and concord. I have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, because, on the one hand, you are under the protection of the English Government, who, as you are probably aware, are friendly towards that

of the Czar; and because, on the other hand, I do not perceive any interference on your part in the affairs of Bokhara.

“Afghanistan and Bokhara ought to have nothing in common; each country ought to look to itself, without busying itself about its neighbour's affairs.

“It was from this point of view that I replied to Abdul Rahman Khan's request to be admitted to Tashkend that my august Master refused hospitality to no one, especially to a man in misfortune, and that I would therefore give him a gracious reception; but that he must not in any way count on my interference in his differences with you, or on any help whatever from me. I desire to maintain friendly relations with you, as you have given me no cause for dissatisfaction.

“I write you this letter in the hope that our relations will for the future be as friendly as they are at present; it would give me great satisfaction to receive from you, in writing, the assurance that it is your intention to carry out the same programme.

“May the Almighty prolong your days for your own glory and the welfare of your people!”
(Page 44.)

Sir A. Buchanan was instructed to express to the Russian Government the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the amicable tone of this letter.
(Page 44).

Arrangement with regard to Afghanistan Frontier.

On the 30th June the India Office forwarded a letter from the Governor-General of India in Council, in which, after recapitulating the friendly assurances received from time to time from the Russian Government, Lord Mayo and his Council laid down the frontier of Afghanistan as follows:—

“M. Stremounehoff has suggested, with a view to the further development of this peaceful policy, that measures should be taken by the British Government and by Russia to ascertain the limits of the territories which acknowledged the sovereignty of Dost Mahomed, and are at present under the Government of Shere Ali Khan, in order that the frontier between those territories and the neighbouring States of Central Asia should be as nearly as possible defined.

“In our telegram of the 11th June, 1869, we have informed your Grace that, if the Ameer should show any disposition to extend his boundaries beyond the limits held by Dost Mahomed, we should remonstrate with him at once. The possessions of the present Ameer on the north and north-west appear to coincide almost exactly with those held by his father; and the limits of Dost Mahomed's kingdom may therefore be generally taken as the boundary which should divide the Kingdom of Afghanistan from the other States of Central Asia to the north and north-west.

“We do not think it necessary to enter on any elaborate review of the rule of Dost Mahomed. The extent of his conquests in Afghan-Turkestan is, we believe, not disputed. Save during very short and exceptional periods, the Oxus has been the recognized boundary between Bokhara and Afghanistan; and in the negotiations between Dost Mahomed and the Ameer of Bokhara in 1859, the latter declared that, if the Afghans would refrain from interference with the Turkomans north of the Oxus, the Bokhara authorities would raise no claim regarding Badakshan, Maimana, and other States south of that river. Practically, the Oxus was the limit of the conquests of Dost Mahomed in the north, from the district of Balkh on the west to the extreme east of Badakshan. The right of the Ameer to Balkh is recognized in the 1st Article of the Treaty concluded with Dost Mahomed on the 26th January, 1857. Its western boundary is the Province of Kerki, which terminates near the ford of Khojah Saleh; and Kerki and Charjui are admitted by Ameer Shere Ali to be Bokharian provinces and to march with his own Provinces of Herat (including Maimana) and Balkh.

“From the western boundary of Balkh to the eastern limits of Badakshan, the entire country between the Oxus and the Hindu Koosh fell under the conquest of Dost Mahomed. In various campaigns between 1850 and 1855, Khulm, Maimana, Andkhai, Shibergham, and Siripool were all conquered. Kunduz was annexed in 1859; Badakshan submitted the same year; and before his death in the trenches at Herat, on the 9th June, 1863, the Dost had consolidated his power in all these territories. Practically, these form the Turkestan provinces now in the possession of Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

“The north-western boundary of what, in our opinion, ought to be considered Shere Ali's dominions, runs in a south-westerly direction from a point on the Oxus between Khojah Saleh and Kerki, skirting and including the Provinces of Balkh, Maimana with its dependencies of Andkhai, &c., and Herat with its dependencies between the Murgham and the Herizrood. The northern boundary is the Oxus from the same point between Kerki and Khojah Saleh eastward to Punjab and Wakkan, and thereafter the stream which passes Wakkan up to the point where the range of the Hindu Koosh meets the southern angle of the Pamir Steppe.” (Page 46.)

When Sir A. Buchanan mentioned this line of frontier to the Russian Government a question was raised as to the position of Khojah Saleh, and he was instructed (page 50)—

"That provided Khojah Saleh, which is at the passage of the Oxus, on the high road from Balkh to Bokhara, is admitted to be Afghan territory, Her Majesty's Government would not object to a definition of frontier by which the rights of Bokhara should be determined to commence at a point upon the left bank of the Oxus, immediately below that place."

Sir A. Buchanan having communicated Lord Mayo's despatch to the Russian Government was informed by M. Stremouchoff that it had been sent to General Kaufmann for observations; and with reference to Khojah Saleh his Excellency said that probably no objection would be made to include it within the Afghan frontier, but that great care would be required in tracing a line from thence to the south, as Merv and the country of the Turkomans were becoming commercially important. (Page 51.)

This mention of Merv is noticeable, as, from its position on the main caravan routes between Central Asia and Persia and India, Merv has always been regarded as a place of the greatest importance. Although now in ruins, and believed to consist of little more than a few sheds and mounds within which the Turkomans seek shelter, it may become a strategical point of great value, since one of the approaches to India might be up the Attrek Valley from the Russian ports on the Caspian, and then across the mountains by way of Merv to Herat. Moreover, being situated on the River Merghab, it might, if the country were settled, again become a grain-producing district.

On the 13th December, 1871 (page 54), Count Brunnow communicated to Lord Granville a despatch from Prince Gortchakow, in which the Russian Government stated that—

"In consequence of the explanations exchanged between them and Mr. Forsyth, it had been agreed in principle—

"1. That the territory in the actual possession, at the present moment, of Shere Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.

"2. That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.

"3. That, for their part, the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.

"These principles had been unreservedly accepted both by the Cabinet of London and the Governor-General of India."

Prince Gortchakow then referred to the boundary line of the Afghan possessions, alluded to in a despatch from Lord Mayo, communicated in May 1870, and said that, as the Russian Government was doubtful in the matter, they had called upon General Kaufmann to report, and were awaiting his reply.

On the 17th October, 1872 ("Correspondence with Russia respecting Central Asia;" presented to Parliament, February 1873, page 1), Lord Granville addressed a despatch to Lord A. Loftus, instructing him to inform the Russian Government that as General Kaufmann's Report had not yet been received, they would no longer delay making known the conclusion at which Her Majesty's Government had arrived, namely, that the Ameer of Cabul had a right to the possession of the territories up to the Oxus, as far down as Khojah Saleh.

For Lord A. Loftus' more complete information, Lord Granville stated:—

"The territories and boundaries which Her Majesty's Government consider as fully belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, viz. :—

"1. Badakshan, with its dependent district Wakhan from the Sarikal (Woods Lake) on the east to the junction of the Kokcha River with the Oxus (or Penjah), forming the northern boundary of this Afghan province throughout its entire extent.

"2. Afghan Turkestan, comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh, the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus from the junction of the Kokcha River to the post of the Khojah Saleh, inclusive, on the high road from Bokhara to Balkh. Nothing to be claimed by the Afghan Ameer on the left bank of the Oxus below Khojah Saleh.

"3. The internal districts of Aksha, Seripool, Maimenat, Shibberjan, and Andkoi, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to independent tribes of Turkomans.

"4. The western Afghan frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian Province of Khorassan is well known, and need not here be defined."

Prince Gortchakow replied (Ibid., p. 4):—

"It becomes necessary for me to recapitulate the different phases of the negotiation between us and the English Cabinet upon this question.

"The two Governments were equally desirous to forestall any cause of disagreement between them in that part of Asia. Both wished to establish such a state of things as would secure peace in those countries, and consolidate the relations of friendship and good understanding between the two Governments.

"They had consequently come to an agreement that it was expedient to have a certain 'intermediary' zone, for the purpose of preserving their respective possessions from immediate contact.

"Afghanistan seemed well fitted to supply what was needed; and it was consequently agreed that the two Governments should use all their influence with their neighbouring States towards preventing any collision or encroachments one side or the other of this 'intermediary' zone.

"All that remained, in order to make the agreement between the two Cabinets as complete in fact as it already was in principle, was to trace the exact limits of the zone.

"It was here that a doubtful point arose.

"The founder of the Afghan State, Dost Mahommed Khan, had left behind him a state of confusion which did not allow of the territorial extension which Afghanistan had acquired at certain moments of his reign, being accepted as a basis.

"It was consequently agreed that no territories should be taken into account, but such as having formerly recognized the authority of Dost Mahommed were still in the actual possession of Shere Ali Khan.

"It thus became necessary to ascertain, with all possible accuracy, what were the territories in his actual possession.

"For this purpose it was requisite to have positive local data, which neither Government possessed, with reference to these distant and imperfectly-known countries.

"It was agreed that the Governor-General of Turkestan should be instructed to take advantage of his residence in the proximity of, and his relations with, the neighbouring Khanates, to collect all the information necessary to throw light upon the question, and to enable the two Governments to come to a practical decision with the facts before them.

"Such was the point, M. le Comte, as your Excellency will recollect, at which our negotiations with the English Cabinet had arrived.

* * * * *

"I will sum them up:

"The question to be settled had two sides—

"1. To ascertain the real state of possession at this moment, so far as it is possible to prove it in those countries.

"2. Starting from this *status quo* as a basis, to seek for a line of demarcation, to be traced, which will best answer the object of the present negotiations; that is, to remove as far as possible all cause of conflict or mutual encroachments between the neighbouring Khanates, and consequently assure, as far as can be done, the state of peace which henceforward the two Governments should respectively use all their influence to cause to be respected.

"Looking at the question from these two points of view, its study led to the following conclusions:—

"1. That to the north the Amou-Daria forms, in fact, the proper frontier of Afghanistan from its confluence with the Khoukteha, as far as the point of Khodja Saleh.

"So far our data confirm the opinion of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and the frontier in question seems the more reasonable, that it can give rise to no disputes on the part of the inhabitants of the banks of the Amou-Daria.

"2. To the north-east, the data we have collected give the confluence of that river with the Koukteha as the limit of the districts over which Shere Ali Khan exercises actual undisputed sovereignty. Beyond that limit, and especially with regard to Badakshan and Wakhan, it has been impossible to find any traces of such a sovereignty; on the contrary, all our information upon the subject goes to prove that these districts should be regarded as independent.

* * * * *

"3. As for the boundaries to be recognized as those of Afghanistan on the north-west, starting from Khodja Saleh, the information we have received equally throws doubts upon the *de facto* possession by the Ameer of Cabul of the towns of Aktchi, Seripool, Meimané, Chibirgan, and Andkhol, which it is a question of comprising within the acknowledged boundaries of Afghanistan.

"These districts, however, being divided from Bokhara by deserts, would not, if annexed to the Afghan territory, offer the same dangers of contact that we have pointed out on the north-east; and their annexation would not, consequently, be open to the same objections.

"If the Government of Her Britannic Majesty adheres to its opinion of the expediency of comprising these places in the limits of the Afghan territory, we will not insist upon the principle from which we started, namely, that no districts should be acknowledged as part of Afghanistan, but such as had been under the rule of Dost Mahommed Khan, and were, at this moment, in actual subjection to Shere Ali Khan. In deference to the wish of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, the Imperial Cabinet would be disposed, as far as this portion of the boundary is concerned, to accept the line laid down in Lord Granville's despatch. Such, M. le Comte, are briefly the conclusions which we think the materials in our hands justify us in forming."

Some further communications (pp. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13) were exchanged between the two Governments with regard to Badakshan and Wakhan, but Prince Gortchakow gave way on this point, January 31, 1873, in a despatch communicated by Count Brunnow (p. 15):—

"The divergence which existed in our views was with regard to the frontiers assigned to the dominions of Shere Ali.

"The English Cabinet includes within them Badakshan and Wakhan, which, according to our views, enjoyed a certain independence. Considering the difficulty experienced in establishing the facts in all their details in those distant parts, considering the greater facilities which the British Government possesses for collecting precise data, and, above all, considering our wish not to give to this question of detail greater importance than is due to it, we do not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England.

"We are the more inclined to this act of courtesy as the English Government engages to use all her influence with Shere Ali in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up all measures of aggression or further conquest. This influence is indisputable. It is based not only on the material and moral ascendancy of England, but also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted to her. Such being the case, we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of peace."

Attrek Valley.

It may be as well to notice that in these Parliamentary Papers reference is made to reports of Russian establishments on the Attrek. The Persian Minister, however, denied, January 29, 1873 ("Central Asia, No. 2, 1873," p. 68), that there was any Firman from the Shah giving the Russians possession of Persian territory on the Attrek, and said he had no knowledge of the Russians having taken possession in any way of the Valley of the Attrek.

This was no doubt correct at the time, but it must be remembered, in reading the Parliamentary Papers, that the Russians have since effectually established themselves at Fort Chikislar, on the right of the mouth of the Attrek, and have made repeated expeditions up the valley.

Communications respecting Khiva.

Sir A. Buchanan reported, November 1, 1869 (p. 4), that Prince Gortchakow had spoken to him respecting an establishment which was proposed to be set up on the Bay of Krasnovodsk, and said that it would be merely a factory, which would, however, of course, require to be protected by a small armed force, but it was incorrect to speak of it as a fort. Its object would be entirely commercial, as it would open a shorter caravan route to Central Asia, and also give increased security to trade by restraining the predatory practices of the Turkomans, and by warning the Khan of Khiva that hostility on his part would not be tolerated hereafter.

On the 18th November (p. 18) Sir A. Buchanan stated that it appeared that arrangements were making for serious military operations against Khiva in the spring, and having spoken about the matter to Prince Gortchakow, his Highness said that unless provocation were given there was no idea of going to war with the Khan, much less of occupying his country, and observed that Sir A. Buchanan might feel assured he would never consent to an extension of the territory of the Empire, and that the Emperor even wished to withdraw from the advanced position already occupied in Bokhara. Sir A. Buchanan answered that he hoped he would maintain his present opinion on this subject with more firmness than when, some years ago, he considered Chemkend a good frontier; and he repeated, in reply, what he formerly said of the force of circumstances having at that time obliged the Government to annex territory beyond the limit they desired.

Sir A. Buchanan added that Prince Gortchakow's language was so apparently sincere, that notwithstanding the strong grounds which existed for believing that an expedition was preparing against Khiva, he should endeavour to hope that preparatory arrangements had only been made for the possible eventuality of resistance being offered by the Ameer to the proposed establishment at Krasnovodsk.

The reports as to an expedition to Khiva having been again mentioned to Prince Gortchakow, December 29 (p. 22), he sent for M. Stremouchoff, and they both declared the statement to be untrue, adding that they could have no other foundation than that something would be done to ascertain whether the theory that the Oxus might be restored to its former bed could be carried out—a measure which Prince Gortchakow said would restore fertility to the country of the Turkomans, and might have the same success as the Suez Canal.

On the 4th April, 1870, Sir A. Buchanan inquired of Prince Gortchakow (p. 38) whether any change had taken place in the relations of Russia and Khiva.

He said that the Khan continued to maintain his silence without vouchsafing any reply to the representations addressed to him by General Kaufmann. It was to be presumed, therefore, that he was dissatisfied with the occupation of Krasnovodsk Bay by Russia, and that he would probably show his dissatisfaction by some overt act of hostility, in which event he would be punished; but his Excellency still professed that the Government have no wish to annex his territories to the Empire.

Sir A. Buchanan added that the prospect of his retaining his independence did not, however, appear to be very satisfactory.

After the establishment of the Russians at Krasnovodsk, there were continual reports of an intention to send an expedition against Khiva, which were always denied by Prince Gortchakow, the fact being, as afterwards appeared, that the relations between Russia and Khiva were gradually becoming more hostile from the Khan's alleged obduracy, but that the expedition, although contemplated, was postponed from time to time (pp. 43, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65).

The expedition against Khiva did not actually take place until 1873. ("Correspondence with Russia respecting Central Asia;" presented to Parliament, February 1873.)

On the 8th January, 1873, Lord Granville received Count Schouvaloff, who had come to London on a special mission. With regard to the expedition to Khiva, as recorded in the despatch from Lord Granville to Lord A. Loftus of that day's date—

"it was true that it was decided upon for next spring. To give an idea of its character it was sufficient to say that it would consist of four and a-half battalions. Its object was to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe. Not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva.

"Count Schouvaloff repeated the surprise which the Emperor, entertaining such sentiments, felt at the uneasiness which it was said existed in England on the subject, and he gave me most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter." (Page 12.)

The Russian forces having overcome the resistance of the Khan, a 'Treaty of Peace was concluded between Russia and Khiva, 12th December, 1873.

By Article I the Khan of Khiva acknowledged himself to be the humble servant of the Emperor of Russia, and renounced the right of maintaining diplomatic relations, or of entering into Commercial or other Treaties with the neighbouring Rulers and Khans; and he further engaged not to undertake military operations against them without the knowledge and permission of the Russian authorities in Central Asia. By subsequent provisions the whole of the territory belonging to Khiva on the right bank of the Oxus, together with the delta of that river from the point where the most westerly branch leaves the main stream, were ceded to Russia, who was also to have the exclusive control of the navigation of the Oxus, and the right of establishing, on the left bank of the river, factories, wharves, and the necessary buildings for the formation of commercial depôts in such localities as may be selected by the Russian authorities for the purpose. An indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles was, moreover, extracted from the Khan, the payment of which was extended over nineteen years, *i.e.*, till November 1892.

It also appeared that a fort was in course of construction on the right bank of the Oxus, near Shourakhan, and about thirty miles distant from the town of Khiva, due east, to receive a Russian garrison.

The Treaty itself was published in the correspondence respecting Central Asia, presented to Parliament, "Russia, No. 2, 1874," and is annexed to this Analysis (Annex A).

In the despatch above quoted the Persian Minister observed that the territory described (*i.e.*, the country north of the Attek) did not belong to Persia. Mr. Alison, in a despatch given at page 18 of "Central Asia, No. 2, 1873," states that although Persia may have exercised some influence north of the Attek in the early days of the present dynasty, he was not aware that there were any grounds on which they could claim Kizil Sou, on the eastern coast of the Caspian, as Persian territory.

The fact is that although, by the Treaties of 1813 and 1828, the boundaries of Russia and Persia on the west of the Caspian are defined by indicating the provinces ceded to Russia under them, the boundary east of the Caspian has not been laid

down. In 1866 the Russians had already a small force at Kizil Sou, called by them Krasnovodak, on Balkan Bay, and the intermediate territory between that place and the Attrek was occupied by the Yomud Turkomans, whose nomad habits have occasioned repeated difficulties as to the rights of Persia between the Attrek and the Goorgan.

Seistan Boundary.

The question of the Seistan boundary, although not directly arising in these Parliamentary Papers, is so important, as bearing on the relations between the Ameer of Cabul and the Indian Government, that it may be useful briefly to call attention to it.

Seistan was wrested from Persia by Ahmed Shah, the founder of the Afghan nation, in 1752. After his death, in 1773, it asserted its claim to independence, and for a long time the right over it remained in dispute between Persia and Afghanistan. By the VIth Article of the Treaty of the 4th March, 1857,* between Great Britain and Persia, the Shah engaged that in case of differences arising between the Government of Persia and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan, the Persian Government would refer them for adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and not take up arms unless these friendly offices failed of effect. During the civil war in Afghanistan which followed on the death of Dost Mahomed in 1863, the Shah occupied the province, but Shere Ali having asserted his rights over it Her Majesty's Government proposed to the Persian Government, in 1870, that the matter should be referred to arbitration. This proposal being accepted by Persia and Afghanistan, Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid was appointed Arbitrator, and having considered the cases of the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, gave his decision in 1872. The effect of this decision was that the rich tract of country designated Seistan proper should be included within the limits of Persia, to be restored to independence under Persian protection, or governed by duly appointed Governors, and that Persia should not possess lands on the right bank of the Helmund. Seistan proper was thus given to Persia, and outer Seistan to Afghanistan. Both the Persian and Afghan Commissioners protested against this decision, but their Governments ultimately formally accepted it.

Communications with Russian Government in 1874.

On the 7th January, 1874 ("Russia, No. 2, 1874," p. 6), Lord Granville addressed a despatch to Lord A. Loftus, in which, after remarking that Her Majesty's Government saw no practical advantage in examining too minutely how far the arrangements of the Treaty with Khiva were in strict accordance with the assurances given to him by Count Schouvaloff as to the intentions with which the expedition against that country was undertaken; Lord Granville recapitulated the negotiations between Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakow in 1869, which led to the agreement with regard to the frontier of Afghanistan, as summarized by Prince Gortchakow in his despatch to Count Brunnow of the 1st November, 1871:—

"1. That the territory in the actual possession at the present moment of Shere Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.

"2. That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.

"3. That, for their part, the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory."

Lord Granville then pointed out that the influence of the Government of India had been faithfully exerted to dissuade the Ameer from interference in Bokhara, and any attempt at encroachment on territories beyond his frontier. Advice of a similarly pacific character had been given by the Indian Government to the Ruler of Yarkand, and they had declined to exercise any interference in the affairs of Bokhara and Khiva, when appealed to, more than once, by Envoys from those countries. The action of the Russian Government on various occasions had also been in accordance with the same policy, as, for instance, in the efforts made by them to discourage any aggression by the Khan of Bokhara on the territories of Afghanistan, and in the refusal of General Kaufmann to give any countenance to

* Presented to Parliament June 8, 1857.

the designs of Abdul Rahman Khan, nephew of the Ameer of Afghanistan, upon the tranquillity of that country.

Lord Granville then stated that it was not unnatural that the Ameer should feel and express some uneasiness at the rapid advance of Russian power towards his frontier, and that his apprehensions had been more especially roused by the reported intention to send a Russian expedition to capture Merv and reduce the Turkoman tribes of those parts, and he had applied to the Government of India for advice.

Lord Granville then commented on the various advances of Russia in Central Asia, and proceeded as follows:—

“In the face of these events it would be unwise not to contemplate the possibility that considerations of self-defence, or the necessity of punishing acts of plunder and hostility may eventually give occasion for a Russian expedition against the Turkoman tribes.

“Those tribes have now applied to the Ameer of Cabul for advice as to the attitude which they should assume towards the Russians, and he, in his turn, has consulted the Government of India as to the reply which he should make. He has at the same time expressed his apprehensions that the result of a Russian expedition against Merv will be to drive the Turkomans to take refuge in the Province of Badkhees, in Herat. This, the Ameer fears, will lay him open to a demand from the Russian authorities that he shall either prevent the Turkomans from committing aggressions, or permit the Russian forces to enter the territories of Afghanistan for the purpose of punishing the hostile tribes. An incident of this kind occurred, as you are aware, not long ago on the Persian frontier, and led to a correspondence between the Russian and Persian Governments.

“The advice given by the Government of India has been in conformity with the policy hitherto pursued. The Ameer has been warned that he should avoid taking any course which would make him responsible for lawless or hostile proceedings on the part of the Turkoman tribes. The Viceroy of India has at the same time endeavoured to reassure him as to the safety of his territories from any aggression or attack on the part of Russia.

* * * * *

“Her Majesty’s Government think it best, however, to bring the fears entertained by the Ameer to the knowledge of the Russian Government, and to express their earnest hope that the question of any further expedition against the Turkoman tribes may be carefully considered, in conjunction with the results which the Ameer of Cabul apprehends may ensue from it. They think it right to state candidly and at once that the independence of Afghanistan is regarded by them as a matter of great importance to the welfare and security of British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia. Should the Turkoman tribes be driven into the neighbourhood of Herat, now or hereafter, in consequence of any military operations effected by Russian power, the Ameer might labour under a double hardship; first, in the disturbance of his dominions; secondly, if he were held responsible for controlling tribes of that wild race, and restraining them from incursions upon the country from which Russia had expelled them. On the one hand, it does not appear how he could justly be held responsible in such circumstances, and, if he were so held, he would have a strong claim to consideration on the part of all such as rightly appreciate his position; on the other hand, questions might thus be raised which it was the object of the engagement entered into between Great Britain and Russia to obviate, and which it cannot be the interest of either country to revive.”

Prince Gortchakow replied, January 21 (p. 10)—

“In my opinion the understanding is complete. It rests not only upon the loyalty of the two Governments, but upon mutual political advantages which are palpably evident. So long as they shall be animated by a spirit of mutual good-will and conciliation, no political misunderstanding is to be apprehended between them.

“For our part, we remain constantly faithful to the programme traced by mutual agreement, as resulted from my interviews with Lord Clarendon, and as developed and defined by the communications between the two Cabinets.

“I have repeated to Lord A. Loftus the positive assurance that the Imperial Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely beyond its sphere of action.

“If on either side the two Governments exercise their ascendancy over the States placed within the range of their natural influence in order to deter them from all aggression, there is reason to hope that no violent collision will occur to disturb the repose of Central Asia and interfere with the work of civilization which it is the duty and the interest of the two great Empires to bring to a favourable issue.

“As far as we are concerned, it is in this sense that we act towards the Khanates which lie upon our borders. We have a full assurance that the Government of India will act in the same manner with regard to the Ameer of Cabul, and we have no doubt that it possesses the means of making itself listened to,

* * * * *

“I have told Lord A. Loftus that we had no intention of undertaking an expedition against the Turkomans; it depended entirely on them to live on good terms with us, and even to derive profit from our proximity and from the outlets which we are endeavouring to make for peaceful commerce; but if these turbulent tribes were to take to attacking or plundering us, we should be compelled to punish them. This is a necessity which Her Majesty’s Government know from their

own experience, and which no Government in contact with wild populations can avoid. We are in any case the first to wish that this punishment, if it becomes necessary, should be inflicted as near as possible to our own frontier."

* * * * *

"Although the eventuality pointed out by Shere Ali is scarcely probable, the Ameer of Cabul can assist in removing the possibility of it by making the Turkomans understand clearly beforehand, that if they provoke rigorous measures by acts of depredation against us, they cannot count upon any assistance or protection from him.

"The Indian Government is certainly in a position to give him this advice in a form which will ensure its effectiveness."

PAPERS PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1878.—(Central Asia No. 1, 1878).

Although these papers are in continuation of the papers presented to Parliament in 1874, it has been found requisite, in order to complete the record of the diplomatic correspondence, to add to them, in an Appendix, the papers already referred to of 1865, and also some papers omitted from the previous series of 1872 and 1874.

The principal subjects dealt with in these papers are the further diplomatic communications with Russia respecting Central Asia; the reported intention of the Russian Commanders to advance on Merv; the affairs of Tashkend and Kashgar; the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul; and the Russian Mission to Afghanistan, the reception of which, and the subsequent conduct of the Ameer, has brought on the present war.

Diplomatic Communications with Russia respecting Central Asia.

On the 11th May, 1875 (p. 25), Count Schouvaloff communicated to Lord Derby a despatch from Prince Gortchakow, dated 5th April, in which he inclosed a Memorandum containing a general statement of the views of the Russian Government as regarded Central Asia. This Memorandum, he said, showed clearly that the limits of the influence to be exercised by the two Governments were distinctly defined by the agreement arrived at between them. While the Russian Government were resolved strictly to observe the limit thus fixed, they considered that the two Governments had maintained their full liberty of action in the countries adjacent to them and placed outside this line. They had each of them in this respect to consider only their own interests and necessities. The Emperor had no intention of extending the frontiers of Russia, such as they existed in Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on the side of Krasnovodsk and the Attek. They had no inducement to do so. On the contrary, the Emperor deemed any extension of the Russian frontiers in those parts as being opposed to their own interests. Prince Gortchakow added that the Russian Government were convinced that if, in presence of these resolutions of the Emperor, the Government of India, on its side, were to exert its influence over the Ameer of Cabul to dissuade him from any inconsiderate act of a kind to excite or encourage the Turkomans, whatever the measures might be which these pillaging tribes might render it necessary for the Russian Government to take to restrain or to punish them, they could in no way prejudice either the *status quo* agreed on between England and Russia, or the good relations which the Russian Government desire to maintain between the two countries.

The Memorandum inclosed commenced by a review of the circumstances which had led to the proposals for a neutral zone at the Heidelberg Conference, which are stated to have been declined by the Russian Ambassador in 1869 in consequence of Lord Clarendon having desired to extend the frontiers of Afghanistan to a fictitious line on the left bank of the Oxus, but to have been resumed in the same year during the negotiations with Mr. Forsyth, when the Memorandum stated the following points had been established by common consent:—

"1. That an antagonism between them in these countries would be contrary to their mutual interests, and to the mission of civilization to which they have been called, each in the sphere of its own natural influence; that it would be highly advantageous to afford to each other mutual support, in order to maintain a state of peace between the Khans of Central Asia, and not to permit the intrigues of those Khans to bring the interests of two great Empires into collision.

"2. That for this purpose it was desirable to preserve an intermediate zone between them, which should secure them from immediate contact.

"3. That Afghanistan should constitute this intermediate zone, if its independence were secured on either side from all encroachment.

"4. That the limits of that State should be recognized in accordance with the line agreed upon after a long negotiation.

"5. That the two Governments, in their respective spheres of influence, England with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and Russia with the Khans of Bokhara and Khokand, should employ themselves reciprocally in preventing all aggression on the part of any one of these Chiefs against the independence and security of the other."

The Memorandum then referred in detail to the discussion with regard to Badakshan and Wakhan and the frontiers of Afghanistan, and entered into some explanations respecting Khiva.

The India Office, to whom these papers were forwarded, pointed out the inaccuracy of the statements with regard to the neutral zone and the limits of Afghanistan (p. 43), and on the 25th October (p. 57) Lord Derby transmitted to Mr. Doria, for communication to Prince Gortchakow, a Memorandum in reply to that which he had received from Count Schouvaloff. The following are the principal passages with regard to the neutral zone and frontiers:—

"It appears from the correspondence which took place at this period,* that the 'intermediary' zone, then under consideration, was intended on both sides to be at the same time a 'neutral' zone; and from this point of view Lord Clarendon distinctly informed Baron Brunnov in April 1869, while thanking the Russian Government for the friendly feelings which had dictated the communication, that, in the opinion of the Secretary of State for India, 'Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory which it was the object of the two Governments to establish, as the frontiers were ill-defined; and if the Russian forces advanced to those frontiers, disputes with the Chiefs on the border would sooner or later, but infallibly, ensue, and Russia might be compelled, however unwillingly, to disregard the arrangement she had entered into; and it was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus, which was south of Bokhara, should be the boundary line, which neither Power should permit their forces to cross. This would leave a large tract of country apparently desert, and marked on the map as belonging to the Khan of Khiva, between Afghanistan and the territory already acquired by Russia, and, if agreed to, would, it might be hoped, remove all fear of future dissension.

"This proposal, as is correctly stated in the Memorandum, was declined by the Imperial Government, on the ground that it gave an extension to the frontiers of Afghanistan, which they could not admit; and this negative answer put an end to the confidential communications between the Russian Ambassador and Lord Clarendon on the question of a 'neutral zone.'

"Whatever may have been the nature of the personal communications between Mr. Forsyth and the Imperial Cabinet, it formed no part of his instructions to reopen the question of a 'neutral zone,' nor does it appear that in the general agreement of opinion under the three heads cited above was this question in any way involved.

"So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, the idea of a 'neutral zone' was definitively abandoned at the time of Lord Clarendon's communication in April 1869, as one which, upon close examination, had been found to be wholly incompatible with the object which both Governments alike had in view throughout these discussions.

"The discussions which took place in the succeeding years as to the delimitation of the frontiers of Afghanistan happily terminated by the 'full and entire' adhesion of the Imperial Cabinet in their despatch of the 19th January, 1873, to the line of demarcation proposed by Lord Granville in his despatch of October 1872, had exclusive reference to the recognition of Afghanistan as an independent State which should remain external to the action of Russia.

"Her Majesty's Government insisted on including Badakshan and Wakhan within the limits of Afghanistan, because such delimitation was, in their view, strictly in accordance with historical facts, and, therefore, necessary, in order to satisfy the legitimate claims of the Ameer.

"Her Majesty's Government have always cordially acknowledged the friendly and conciliatory course taken by the Imperial Cabinet in accepting the views thus set forth by Great Britain, and in thus removing, it is hoped, the only remaining obstacle to a complete understanding between the two Governments with respect to the position of Afghanistan. But it is apparent from the résumé of the agreement given at the close of the Memorandum, and the paragraphs which follow, that the Imperial Cabinet is of opinion that in arriving at an understanding with respect to Afghanistan, the common policy of the two Governments has been completely fulfilled, and that it is a part of such understanding that entire liberty of action is left to Russia in all the territories lying between her own frontier and that of Afghanistan.

"It is with reference to this opinion that it is essential that the views of Her Majesty's Government should be clearly explained.

"The point of departure of the two Governments in exchanging their views was the mutual desire to arrive at some common understanding as to the best means of preventing the contact of their respective possessions in Central Asia.

"Various combinations were proposed and discussed with this object—the creation of a neutral zone, the delimitation of frontiers, the recognition of the Oxus as a line which neither Power should

* Interview at Heidelberg.

permit their forces to cross, the maintenance of Afghanistan and Bokhara as independent States, the former under British, and the latter under Russian influence.

"This last combination, as represented in the Memorandum under consideration, appears to be the only form of an arrangement with regard to which any definite understanding has been found practicable, and Her Majesty's Government have always fully appreciated the conciliatory spirit in which this question has been approached by the Russian Government.

"But it is obvious that the settlement made with respect to Afghanistan can only partially effect the object which the two Governments desired to attain, namely, that of averting possible causes of future collision between them.

"Her Majesty's Government fully accept the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet as to the extension of the southern frontiers of Russian territory; but they equally admit the force of the arguments which have been advanced to explain the repeated annexations which, in spite of these assurances, have taken place.

"However sincere, therefore, the desire of the Russian Government to avoid future extension of territorial responsibilities, Her Majesty's Government cannot regard the present line of Russian frontier as fixed and immovable. The recurrence of similar causes may lead to similar results, and Her Majesty's Government could not regard with indifference, and as a matter with which they have no concern, further occupation and absorption by Russia of the regions which will separate Afghanistan from the Russian territory.

"The grounds of the apprehensions entertained by Her Majesty's Government on this subject have been so fully stated on former occasions, that it is only necessary now to refer to previous communications, and particularly to Lord Granville's despatch to Lord A. Loftus of the 7th January, 1874, which discusses them at length.

"Whatever may be the ultimate destiny of Russia in the course of its civilizing mission in Central Asia, it is impossible not to see that, in view of the present conditions of the Turkoman tribes, of the relations in which they stand to the Ruler of Afghanistan on the one hand, and those between that Ruler and the Government of India on the other, that each successive advance of the Russian frontier towards Afghanistan may involve complications which it is equally the interest of both England and Russia to avoid, and may raise up the most serious obstacles to the continued pursuance of the policy which has hitherto guided both Powers alike to maintain intact the integrity of Afghan territory.

"This is an object to which Her Majesty's Government attach the highest importance, and they must reserve to themselves the most complete liberty of action under all future contingencies as to the measures which may, in their opinion, be necessary to secure it. They cannot but feel that such an event, for instance, as the occupation of Merv, which would bring the line of Russian territory into direct contact with Afghan territory, would arouse the susceptibilities of the Ameer to the highest degree, and possibly involve him in a common course of defensive action with the Turkoman tribes upon his borders. Under such circumstances it is unnecessary to observe how difficult it might be for the Imperial Government to maintain a policy of strict abstention in accordance with its present assurances, or how impossible it might be for Her Majesty's Government to exert any effectual control over the actions of the Ameer, without undertaking responsibilities which they would most reluctantly assume, and which would virtually involve the very result which both Governments desire to avert, viz., the contact of the two Powers in Central Asia."

Prince Gortchakow rejoined, on the 25th February, 1876 (p. 69), by an instruction to Count Schouvaloff, to inform Lord Derby—

"that we entirely agree in the conclusion that, while maintaining, on either side, the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which have been recognized as unpractical; that, while retaining entire freedom of action, they should be guided by a mutual desire to pay due regard to their respective interests and necessities, by avoiding, as far as possible, any immediate contact with each other, and any collisions between the Asiatic States placed within the circle of their influence.

"We are convinced that by keeping to this principle, and cultivating feelings of equity and reciprocal goodwill, the two Cabinets will succeed in consolidating the friendly relations so happily established between them, for the advantage of the general peace in Europe and Asia."

Correspondence respecting Merv.

The rumours of an intention to attack the Turkomans and occupy Merv continued to be repeated on almost every occasion when Russian expeditions were sent out from Krasnovodsk or Chikishlar, and became complicated by the apprehension that, if the Turkomans were expelled from Merv, they would take refuge in the country north of Herat, and a collision might then ensue between the Turkomans and the Afghans, in which the Persians, and possibly the Russians, might be involved.

At an audience with the Emperor of Russia in January 1874 (page 5), Lord Augustus Loftus mentioned to the Emperor that a feeling of alarm existed in some portion of the public mind in England—

"at certain reports propagated by the press of an intended Russian expedition in the spring against the independent Turkoman tribes, a restless race, who led a wandering life among the steppes situated between the Caspian and Afghanistan. Such an expedition might be productive of dangers now unforeseen. It might drive the Turkomans on the soil of Afghanistan or into the province of Herat, which might produce complications with the Ruler of Afghanistan. This was a danger which it would be wise to foresee, in order to avoid.

"His Majesty said at once that there was no intention of making any expedition against the Turkomans; but, if they should attack or molest the Russian settlements, they must suffer for the consequences of it."

On the 13th April, 1874 (page 12), Count Brunnow communicated despatches stating that the Emperor had given positive orders that no expedition should be undertaken against the Téké Turkomans in the direction of Merv, and that the scientific expedition should be strictly confined to scientific objects.

The scientific expedition thus referred to was for the survey of the Lower Oxus.

On the 12th March, 1875, Lord Derby told Count Schouvaloff (page 24) that the only case in which he could conceive an advance of British troops westward as probable, was in the event of any Russian movement tending to the occupation of Merv.

On the 6th October Mr. Doria reported (page 56) that Baron Jomini had read to him a portion of a despatch stating that the Ameer of Afghanistan was stirring up ill-feeling among the Merv Turkomans.

On the 15th November, 1876, Lord A. Loftus reported (page 89) that there was no foundation for the rumours of an expedition against Merv, and, on the 17th (page 89) that M. de Giers had informed him that it was stated that an Afghan army was assembled at Herat for an expedition against the Merv Turkomans.

On the 13th June, 1877, Lord Derby addressed a despatch to Lord A. Loftus (page 111), in which, after referring to Lord Granville's despatch of the 7th January, 1874, and to the Memoranda exchanged with the Russian Government, he instructed Lord A. Loftus—

"to make a renewed representation to the Government of Russia on the subject of the movements of Russian troops now taking place on the Turkoman steppe, recalling the above observations to their recollection, and clearly, though courteously, pointing out that the occupation of Merv would be held by the general opinion of the inhabitants of the neighbouring regions of Asia to announce a design on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to extend his influence, if not his dominion, into territories with which Her Majesty's Government have understood from the Government of His Imperial Majesty that it is not His Majesty's intention to interfere.

"Such an impression would impose upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of making a corresponding advance in order to allay apprehension and to remove misconception from the minds of the people of those countries. They could not, however, look upon so close an approximation of the outposts of the two Empires as in itself desirable, or likely to facilitate the discharge of the difficult duties with which the administrations of each Government are charged.

"Her Majesty's Government therefore hope that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will issue to his officers in those countries the strictest injunctions to abstain, in the course of any operations which the misconduct of the Turkomans may render necessary, from advancing into the neighbourhood of Merv."

In August 1877, Mr. Thomson reported (page 121) that negotiations were proceeding between the Khorassan authorities and the Merv Turkomans with a view to the latter declaring their allegiance to Persia.

On the 23rd October, 1877, Lord A. Loftus stated (page 123) that he had inquired of M. de Giers whether any answer had been sent through Count Schouvaloff to the representation which he had made under Lord Derby's instruction with regard to Merv, and, in reply, M. de Giers gave him a copy of a despatch addressed to Count Schouvaloff, dated the 18th July, 1877, in which it was denied that there was any intention to make an expedition against Merv.

On the 3rd January, 1878 (p. 124), Mr. Thomson forwarded a Memorandum containing information derived from one of the Merv Chiefs respecting the arrangement between the Persian Government and the Téké Turkomans, as follows:—

- " 1. The Merv Turkomans declare their allegiance to Persia.
- " 2. They engage that raids by them on this country shall entirely cease.
- " 3. That the Persian flag is to be hoisted at Merv.
- " 4. That a Persian Agent shall reside at Merv on the part of the Shah.
- " 5. That 100 hostages (men of position from the four divisions of the tribe) shall reside at Meshed, but without their families.
- " 6. That a body of 1,000 horsemen shall be sent to Meshed (about 250 from each division of the

tribe) to be employed in the service of the Persian Government. These horsemen are to provide their own horses and arms, and to be under the command of their own Chiefs, but they are to be paid by the Persian Government, and they may be employed in any part of Persia where their services are required.

"The Persian Government state their readiness to agree to the following points:—

"1. They recognize the Merv Turkomans as Persian subjects, and promise them protection and favourable treatment.

"2. They agree to defray the expenses of the hostages sent to Meshed, which may be estimated at about 6,000 tomans a-year.

"3. They undertake to pay the horsemen furnished by the Turkomans for service in Persia at the same rate as that allowed by the Government to the Khorassan irregular horse, which will amount to over 30,000 tomans annually.

"4. They grant permission for 1,000 families of Merv Téké Turkomans to occupy Old Serekhs, and the lands adjacent on the Tejjen."

On the 14th February (p. 127), Mr. Thomson transmitted a translation of the Shah's Firman acknowledging the allegiance of the Téké Turkomans.

Other papers with regard to the rumours of Russian expeditions against Merv will be found at pp. 10, 46, 107, 115, 130, 131, and a subsidiary question with regard to the efforts made by the Indian Government through the Ameer of Cabul to procure the restoration by the Téké Turkomans of some Russian prisoners is mentioned at pp. 43, 48, 54, 61, 65, 81.

Attrek.

It is to be observed that the Turkomans are divided into three principal tribes; the Yomuds, who extend from Krasnovodsk to the Attrek, and frequently pass across it into the Goorgan Valley, the Akhal Téké, who occupy the country along the Persian frontier to the east of the Yomuds, and the Merv Téké, whose headquarters are further eastward at Merv.

On the 23rd June, 1874 (p. 17), Lord A. Loftus called the attention of M. de Stremouchoff to a Circular addressed by General Llamakin to the Turkoman tribes, in which he described himself as appointed by the Czar to be the supreme authority on the Attrek and Goorgan. M. de Stremouchoff said that there were several inaccuracies in the report, and that there was no expression of submission of the tribes to the Czar, nor any reference made by the General to their subjection to Russia.

Being further pressed on the matter (p. 21), M. de Westmann, on behalf of the Russian Government, stated that the Circular had been incorrectly translated, and there had been a misunderstanding, which had been happily and satisfactorily rectified with the Persian Government, and on Lord A. Loftus referring to the correspondence in 1835 and 1838, in which both Governments agreed upon the necessity of maintaining the integrity of Persia, M. de Westmann replied that the correspondence alluded to merely applied to the succession to the Persian throne, a misapprehension, which Lord A. Loftus was instructed (p. 22) to correct as altogether inaccurate. M. de Westmann thereupon admitted the existence of the understanding as to the integrity of Persia and its continued validity; but remarked that when the Seistan Boundary Arbitration was undertaken, and a portion of Seistan awarded to Afghanistan, no communication had been made to Russia.

From a proclamation issued by General Llamakin to the Yomuds in February 1877 (p. 108) it appears that they had come under Russian protection. It is addressed to all the families, Elders, &c., who every year and at all times come and reside on the banks of the Attrek, within the dominions of the Emperor of Russia, and states that he had received orders to march against the hostile Turkomans and to erect a fort at Kizil Arvat and to maintain a permanent garrison there.

Kizil Arvat is about 150 miles from Krasnovodsk, north of the Persian frontier, and between the districts of the Yomuds and the Akhal Turkomans. It appears by subsequent reports that, probably as a result of the measures thus announced by General Llamakin, the Akhal Turkomans have also given in their submission to Russia.

The accounts further show that the Russians have succeeded in opening a communication from Kizil Arvat to Chat, near the junction of the Simbar and Attrek Rivers, and have thus a double access to the Attrek Valley. The present state of things, therefore, is that General Llamakin has claimed the territory on the Attrek as Russian, and has secured the subjection of both the Yomud and

Akhal Turkomans along the Persian frontier, while the Merv Turkomans have declared their allegiance to Persia. (See also pp. 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 41, 52, 109, 110, 117, 130, 146, 152.)

Yarkand. Yakoob Beg.

Yakoob Beg, known as the Atalik Ghazee, having made himself master of Kashgar in 1866, sent an Envoy to Calcutta in 1870, who requested that a British officer might be sent back with him on a friendly visit to the Court of the Atalik Ghazee.*

Mr. T. D. Forsyth was appointed for this duty, and furnished a Report of his visit to Yarkand, which was presented to Parliament in 1871. He was unable to have an interview with Yakoob Beg, as he had gone on a warlike expedition to Oorumtis, about 700 miles distant.

The communication thus opened up with the Atalik Ghazee, and the mission of Mr. Shaw to Yarkand in 1874, gave rise to various representations on the part of the Russian Government, especially with regard to the alleged gift to the Atalik Ghazee of a large number of firearms. The Indian Government denied that arms and ammunition had been sent to Yarkand, and said that Mr. Shaw's mission was purely commercial.

As Yakoob Beg died in 1877, and his Empire was destroyed by the reconquest of Kashgar by the Chinese, it is sufficient to indicate the pages at which this question is referred to, viz., pp. 14, 15, 17, 25, 89.

Khokand.

There are several papers respecting the proceedings of the Russians against Khokand.

In 1875, bands from Khokand having invaded Russian territory, measures were taken to repress them, and after a battle at Mahram the Khan gave in his submission. The matter ended by the Khanate of Khokand being incorporated, in February 1876, in the Russian dominions, under the title of the Province of Ferghanah (pp. 49, 55, 56, 70).

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.

Assurances given by Russia with regard to Afghanistan.

At an interview with Prince Gortchakow, January 1874 (p. 5), his Highness took occasion to state that Russia considered Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of her action, and that the Russian Government would strictly adhere to this policy; and a few days afterwards repeated (p. 7) that the Imperial Government considered that kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might, in the internal state of that country the Imperial Government would not interfere.

He referred to the positive injunctions given to Abdul Rahman Khan by the Imperial Government, as the condition on which he was permitted to reside at Samarcand, that he should abstain from all intrigues and designs dangerous to the present Ruler of Afghanistan, and his Highness repeated that should he contravene them he will be removed from his present place of residence.

His Highness further informed Lord A. Loftus that a scientific mission was intended to explore and survey the course of the Lower Oxus, for the purpose of improving the navigation.

It had been suggested to him that this expedition for a similar object might extend these explorations and researches to the Upper Oxus, as far as Sirikul, or Wood's Lake, which portion forms the boundary of Afghanistan.

His Highness remarked, however, that he was opposed to this suggestion, considering that it might give rise to false suppositions, and be attributed to wrong motives.

Other assurances given by Prince Gortchakow on the 7th March, 1869, on the 17th February, 1874, and on the 15th February, 1876, have already been referred to.

* Papers presented to Parliament by India Office, 1871, Yarkand (Forsyth's Mission).

Lord Derby's Conversation with Count Schouvaloff, March 1875.

At an interview with Count Schouvaloff, his Excellency (p. 24)—

“proceeded to explain at some length what he described as his personal views on the subject of the extension of Russian power in Central Asia, as to which it is sufficient to say that they were unfavourable to fresh annexations. He asked whether he was right in supposing that there was no inclination on the part of England to advance farther in the direction of the Russian possessions, unless such advance were considered by us necessary for defensive purposes, in order to protect our actual dominions. I said that his view was undoubtedly correct, and that, so far from desiring to annex any part of Afghanistan, we should deprecate such a result as bringing only increased cost and trouble without advantage. We wished to be on good terms with the Afghan Ruler, and to exercise a friendly influence over his policy, but his independence was not likely to be menaced by us. The only case in which I could conceive an advance of British troops westward as probable was in the event of any Russian movement tending to the occupation of Merv.

“I reminded Count Schouvaloff that I had warned him some months back of the great importance which the Indian Government attached to Merv, and of the danger to our relations that would ensue if it were meddled with. He said that he remembered what I had told him on that subject, and had communicated it to his Government. He quite saw the danger that might arise if the two Powers were brought face to face in the neighbourhood of Herat. ‘Was he justified,’ he asked, ‘in assuming that our action in this matter would depend on that of Russia, that England would not move if Russia did not?’ I said I thought he might feel safe on that point; we only desired the maintenance of the *status quo*, and certainly should not be the first to take steps that might be considered aggressive. He said his Government would be perfectly satisfied with this expression of intentions from me, hinting that the language of some of our newspapers had created distrust and suspicion in Russia.”

Quetta.

On the 30th March, 1875 (page 25), Lord A. Loftus said he had reason to believe that the Russian Government were somewhat disquieted by the newspaper reports of the intention of the Indian Government to occupy Quetta, and that they considered that this move would be the precursor of the occupation of Herat.

Lord Derby replied, 15th September (page 51), forwarding a copy of a despatch from the Indian Government expressing the opinion that it is desirable that no doubt should rest with the Russian Government as to the right of the British Government to station troops in any part of the territory of the Khan of Khelat.

The despatch proceeds:—

“I inclose, for your information, a copy of the Treaty* between the British Government and the Chief of Khelat, securing this right to England, and I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of mentioning this matter to the Russian Government; but you will not fail to accompany your statement by an explanation that Her Majesty's Government have no intention of using their right unless a necessity for it arises.”

Afghan Expedition to Maimena.

The Ameer of Cabul having determined to take measures for the subjection of the Meer of Maimena, who was accused of being in treasonable correspondence with Bokhara and Abdul Rahman Khan, the Indian Government suggested that the Russian Government should be informed, and Mr. Doria was accordingly instructed to do so, 20th September, 1875 (page 54).

The Russian Government said that, Russia having ceded her pretensions to Maimena at England's instance, no objection could be made so long as the Ameer loyally kept his action to enforcing the tranquillity of Maimena (page 55).

Correspondence as to Yarkand Frontier and resistance of aggression on Afghanistan, 1873.

In the Appendix (page 26) will be found a correspondence between the India Office and the Foreign Office, in which the former forwarded copies of despatches from the Governor-General of India, dated the 20th June, 1873, one of which contains a review of the policy agreed upon between England and Russia in regard to Central Asia, and the other a proposal that an understanding should be come to with regard to the frontiers of Yarkand and Afghanistan.

In the former despatch, which will be found at page 103 of the correspondence published by the India Office, the following paragraph (No. 18) occurs:—

* Appendix (B).

"Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops, in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance."

Lord Granville gave the following reply on the 25th August, 1873:—

"I have laid before Lord Granville your letters of the 14th instant, one inclosing a despatch from the Government of India of the 30th June, reviewing the late negotiations with Russia respecting the boundaries of Afghanistan; the other a despatch of the same date, suggesting that a proposal should be made to Russia with the view of defining the northern and western boundary of Yarkand; and I am to request that you will state to the Duke of Argyll that Lord Granville would not think it desirable to communicate to the Russian Government, as suggested by the Indian Government, a copy of the former despatch, and so convey to it indirectly an intimation that any aggression by it on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain with force of arms; and his Lordship would not think it expedient to run the risk of raising, without absolute and pressing necessity at the present moment, any question with Russia respecting the frontiers of Yarkand, as suggested in the latter despatch.

"Lord Granville, however, desires that the opinions expressed in this letter may be considered simply as having reference to the propriety of present action in either of the points referred to, and not as indicating any desire or tendency to modify the policy which it has been agreed upon to pursue in Central Asia generally, and with respect to Afghanistan in particular."

Communications between General Kaufmann and the Ameer.

The letter sent by General Kaufmann to the Ameer in 1870, respecting Abdul Rahman Khan, has already been noticed. The correspondence which arose out of it with the Ameer, and subsequent communications which passed between them, are given in Appendix No. 2 of "Central Asia, No. 1, 1878."

It will be seen that the Ameer asked the Viceroy to obtain the translation of the letter into Persian, and begged to be furnished with such an answer to it as the Viceroy might consider appropriate and advisable.

Further communications took place in 1871 (Appendix 2, pp. 10, 11, 12), and in 1872 (pp. 16, 20, 21).

The next letter, or murrasilla as it is called, appears to be dated November 16th, 1873, and will be found at p. 8 of "Central Asia, No. 1, 1878," in which the remainder of the correspondence is also incorporated.

In December 1873 the Ameer received a letter from the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan announcing the occupation of Khiva (p. 9).

Another letter reporting the marriage of the Duchess of Edinburgh, and congratulating the Ameer on the nomination of his son Abdoolla Khan as Heir Apparent, is dated 25th February, 1874 (p. 14).

There is another letter from the officiating Governor-General of Tashkend, 18th December, 1873 (p. 15).

In October 1875 (p. 62) the Viceroy forwarded a Cabul Diary, stating that a Aishan Khwaga, a Samarcand Elder, had arrived at Cabul with a letter from General Kaufmann. This Envoy left almost immediately with the Ameer's reply.

In January 1876 a messenger arrived from Bokhara with a letter from General Kaufmann (p. 71).

In June 1876 Mirza Abdul Karim, another Samarcandi, arrived with a letter from General Kaufmann (p. 75.) This letter is very long, and contains an account of the Russian proceedings at Khokand.

On the 16th September, 1876, the Viceroy telegraphed as follows:—

"We send you a despatch by this next mail, expressing decided opinion on necessity of Her Majesty's Government remonstrating with Russia on Kaufmann's repeated correspondence with Ameer by hand of Russian Agents, two of whom are now in Cabul.

"Although hitherto the Government of India have not asked Her Majesty's Government to formally remonstrate on this open breach of repeated pledges, we now deem it necessary to request you to do so, as the correspondence is creating much sensation at Cabul, and forms basis of intrigue which may seriously impair our relations with Ameer.

"We will on our part take earliest favourable opportunity of co-operating with any action you

may deem expedient to impress on Ameer risk he runs and necessity for his stopping reception of these intriguing Agents.

"If without waiting receipt of despatch you can act at once on this information, result of such action communicated to me by telegraph may favourably affect negotiation mentioned in my accompanying telegram.

In forwarding this telegram Lord Salisbury stated that he concurred in the views expressed by the Viceroy, and was of opinion that, as suggested by his Excellency, a remonstrance against General Kaufmann's proceedings should be addressed to the Russian Government without delay (p. 79).

Lord Derby accordingly addressed a despatch to Lord A. Loftus, 2nd October, 1876 (p. 80), in which, after alluding to General Kaufmann's letters to the Ameer, he instructed Lord A. Loftus to address a note to the Russian Government, reminding them of their repeated assurances that "Afghanistan is completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence," and to endeavour, if possible, to obtain from the Russian Government a written disclaimer of any intention on their part to negotiate Treaties with Shere Ali without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

On the 10th October, 1876, Lord Derby took an opportunity of speaking on the subject to Count Schouvaloff, reminding his Excellency that the Russian Government had on several occasions answered Her Majesty's Government that Afghanistan was completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence, and pointing out to him that the despatch of Russian Agents to Cabul with a letter to the Ameer from General Kaufmann was contrary to this understanding, and might give rise to some uneasiness in India.

Count Schouvaloff replied that he had no knowledge of the matter, but would communicate with his Government upon it (p. 80).

On the 10th October Count Schouvaloff read to Lord Derby a telegram received from Prince Gortchakow in the following words:—

"Démentez catégoriquement que Kaufmann agit à Cabul, soit par un Agent ou soit d'une autre manière (p. 80.)

On the 18th October the India Office forwarded to Lord Derby a despatch (p. 83) dated September 18th, from the Viceroy, commenting on the letter from General Kaufmann, contrasting it and the communications between the General and the Ameer which had preceded it with the Russian assurances that Afghanistan was entirely beyond the sphere of Russian influence, and urging that the attention of the Russian Government should be seriously called to the fact of this correspondence, and that steps should be taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent a continuance of such proceedings.

"In venturing to suggest this course for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, we would represent that the issue more or less involved in the continuance or discontinuance of the correspondence between the Russian officers and the Ameer of Cabul is one not of merely local or Indian, but of Imperial interest, affecting as it does the important question whether the influence of England is to be superseded and replaced by that of Russia at the Court of the Ameer. The assurances of non-interference in Afghanistan, given and reiterated by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to the Government of Her Majesty, have been from time to time communicated, with every expression of confidence in their sincerity, by the Government of India to the Ameer of Cabul. As the communications with His Highness, now systematically carried on by the Russian military authorities in Central Asia, are plainly irreconcilable with the above-mentioned assurances, it is obvious that the Ameer can only attribute their increasing frequency, and prolonged toleration, either to the acquiescence of the British Government, or to its inability to resent so open a disregard of those pledges on which its reliance has been publicly and repeatedly recorded. In either case, the result cannot fail to be destructive of all confidence and security in our relations with Afghanistan. The action open to the Government of India for the control of those relations is necessarily limited to the exercise of pressure upon the Ameer of Cabul; but we shall, on our part, lose no opportunity of co-operating with such steps as Her Majesty's Government may be pleased to take in this matter, by our endeavours to convince the Ameer of the imprudence, as well as the impropriety, of the present correspondence between His Highness and the Russian Generals."

The Cabul Diary which accompanied this despatch showed that there were two Russian Mahomedan Envoys at Cabul, the second of whom waited on the Ameer on the 23rd August, and submitted a letter from General Kaufmann, announcing his return to Tashkend from St. Petersburg (p. 85).

On the 24th August (page 86) Lord Derby forwarded copies of these Papers to Lord A. Loftus, and said that it was his intention to give Count Schouvaloff a copy

of General Kaufmann's letter of February, and to point out to him that his Government would seem to have been kept in ignorance of the General's proceedings.

At an interview of Lord A. Loftus with M. de Giers on the 19th (page 86), the latter stated that he had no knowledge of any such Agent having been sent by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Afghanistan, nor, after inquiry at the Ministry of War, could he ascertain that there was any information of any letter having been addressed or sent to Shere Ali by General Kaufmann in February last.

His Excellency further observed that at that time General Kaufmann was at St. Petersburg.

His Excellency expressed a wish to see a copy of the letter in question, as he must suppose that it was apochryphal.

Lord A. Loftus did not consider that he was authorized to conform to this wish without Lord Derby's authorization.

M. de Giers stated that he had written to General Kaufmann for information, and that on his receiving his reply he would, in conformity with Lord A. Loftus' request, give him a written answer.

On the 7th November (page 88) Lord Derby informed Lord A. Loftus that Count Schouvaloff had returned the copy of General Kaufmann's letter without remark, and Lord Derby authorized his Excellency to give a copy to M. de Giers.

On the 15th November (page 89) Lord A. Loftus mentioned to Prince Gortchakow the communications which General Kaufmann was carrying on directly with the Ameer of Afghanistan through a secret Agent who had arrived some time ago at Cabul, and was still residing there; and he observed to him that these communications were not in conformity with the engagement taken by Russia, as recorded by his Highness himself, when he declared that Russia considered Afghanistan to be beyond the sphere of her political action.

Prince Gortchakow replied that there was no Russian Agent at Cabul as far as he knew, and that General Kaufmann had merely forwarded a complimentary letter to the Ameer, as he was in the habit of doing on returning to his post.

"But," added his Highness, "quand nous avons en main une baleine, je ne puis pas m'occuper des petits poissons."

On the 17th November (page 90) M. de Giers stated that there was no question of General Kaufmann entering into political communication with the Ameer of Afghanistan, nor was there the remotest idea of any Treaty engagements. The Agent was simply charged to deliver a letter of courtesy from General Kaufmann to the Ameer, which was an usual custom on his resuming the duties of his post, and as the Governor-General of a neighbouring State.

To this Lord Loftus replied that he was not the Governor of a neighbouring State, inasmuch as the Khanate of Bokhara was still to be regarded as an independent State, and that he therefore considered it necessary that General Kaufmann should receive express orders from the Imperial Government to desist in future from sending Agents to Cabul and from entertaining political communication with the Ameer of Afghanistan.

On the 6th December (p. 92) Lord A. Loftus called M. de Giers' attention to an article from the "Agence Russe," stating that the Russian papers announce that the Indian papers "Rassul" and "Bombay Gazette" have received a telegram from Lahore, stating that the Ameer of Cabul had evinced the intention of receiving the Envoy of Russia with all the honours prescribed by Oriental etiquette. In view of which the English Ambassador at Cabul, Mahomed Khan, had declared that his Government would view such an act as an offence. The Ameer, having persisted in his decision, the English Ambassador had asked for his passports and left Cabul.

M. de Giers said that he knew nothing of this report, and had not even seen it in the Russian press. He considered it as utterly unfounded and of pure invention.

Admitting that the intelligence in question might be greatly exaggerated, he observed to his Highness that he had certain information of General Kaufmann having sent two, if not three, Agents to Cabul, and his Excellency would therefore see how necessary it was, with a view to maintain the engagements with Her Majesty's Government, that General Kaufmann should be instructed to abstain from sending Agents to Cabul, and from entering into official communications with the Ameer of Afghanistan.

His Excellency replied that he could answer for General Kaufmann not having entered into any political negotiations with the Ameer of Afghanistan. He was

daily expecting the answer from the General to the question he had addressed to him on the subject of my previous communication, and, on its receipt, would inform his Lordship of it.

On the 1st December (p. 94) M. de Giers addressed a note to Lord A. Loftus stating that the Imperial Ministry had no knowledge of the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer, of which Lord A. Loftus had furnished copies, but they had asked General Kaufmann for explanations.

On the 15th M. de Giers forwarded a letter from General Kaufmann as follows (p. 96) :—

“Your Excellency was good enough to transmit to me, in your letter of the 8th October last, the translation of a note of the English Ambassador at the Imperial Court relative to a supposed Agent whom I was said to have dispatched to Cabul, according to information received by the British Government, in order to conclude a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, and also a Treaty of Commerce.

“I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency that, since entering on my duties as Governor-General of Turkestan, my relations with Shere Ali Khan have been limited to interchanges of civility, and that I have never sent to Cabul either Agents or even a single Djigitte.

“My letters have always been sent, once or twice a-year, through the Ameer of Bokhara, who forwarded them to Cabul, or by a Djigitte of Samarcand addressed to the Chief of Balkh, who sent them on to the Ameer of Afghanistan.

“These communications had never any other character than one of pure courtesy, as your Excellency can convince yourself from the copies kept in the Asiatic Department.

“I avail myself of this opportunity to affirm that my conduct towards the neighbouring Khanates and others has never been a mystery to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and that it has always been in accordance with the supreme orders which His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to give me since my nomination to my post.

“My personal convictions do not admit the necessity of any stratagem or subterfuge for the satisfactory transaction of affairs, and I venture to hope that a long series of years has convinced the Imperial Government of the absence of any political intrigues in my relations with the Asiatic Khanates, intrigues contrary to my personal character, which is as much opposed to deception in political as in private life.

“His Highness the Chancellor of the Empire has entirely approved this view of our affairs in Central Asia.

“I have the honour, therefore, to beg your Excellency to be so good as to protest formally against the assertions contained in the note of the British Ambassador, which are completely without foundation.

“I deny that the source from which this entirely erroneous information may have been derived can have any authentic character.”

On the 1st December (p. 99) the Viceroy reported that another Agent had been sent by General Kaufmann with a letter to the Ameer.

On the 7th February, 1877 (p. 101), at the suggestion of the India Office, Lord Derby addressed the following despatch to Lord A. Loftus :—

“With reference to your despatches of the 6th and of the 16th December, 1876, inclosing respectively the formal reply of the Russian Government relative to the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul, and the explanations which General Kaufmann has furnished to his Government on the same subject, Her Majesty's Government observe that the statement that Russian Agents have been sent to Cabul with the object of negotiating a Treaty with the Ameer is denied both by the Russian Government and General Kaufmann, and that it is asserted that the General's communications have been merely letters of courtesy sent through the Ameer of Bokhara.

“Her Majesty's Government have received the assurance on the first point with satisfaction, but they cannot accept as correct the general view of the correspondence taken by the Russian Government. Without referring to earlier communications, it is impossible to regard as a mere letter of courtesy General Kaufmann's letter of February last, which contained a detailed account of the Russian conquest of Khokand, with justificatory remarks of a suggestive character, while, as regards the allegation that the bearers of the different letters have not been Russian Agents but messengers employed by the Ameer of Bokhara, it is enough to observe that they have been viewed at Cabul in the former light, and treated accordingly.

“The fact that the character both of the letters and of their bearers is open to such misconstruction is a sufficient reason for the issue by the Russian Government to General Kaufmann of orders to altogether discontinue his communications to the Ameer.

“In his note of the 1st December M. Giers, after dealing with the immediate subject under discussion, mentions certain statements which have been reported to the Imperial Government from Tashkend, and which he considers of a nature to justify that Government in calling for explanation in its turn from the Government of Her Majesty.

“These statements are that a simultaneous movement of British troops into the territory of the Ruler of Swat, and of Afghan detachments into Darwaz, a State vassal to Bokhara, either has been or is about to be made; and that Afghan armaments are preparing at Herat in view to an expedition against the Turkomans of Merv.

"Her Majesty's Government consider that some explanations should be obtained from Prince Gortchakow of the reference to the alleged British expedition against Swat, which is a valley in the immediate vicinity of Peshawar, on the southern side of the Hindoo Kush, inhabited by tribes whom the Indian Government has often been compelled to punish, but with whom at present it is not on bad terms.

"In any case, Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand how such a movement, even were it contemplated, could be regarded as a breach of the Agreement of 1872, between the Russian and British Governments, which had reference solely to the relations of the former Government with Afghanistan, and the general obligation which the British Government accepted to use its influence with the Ameer to deter him from aggressive movements beyond his recognized borders. The influence of the Government of India has been consistently exercised to that end. No information has reached Her Majesty's Government, nor is there any reason to believe either that the Ameer contemplates aggression on Darwaz, or that the preparations which have been for some time past in progress at Herat are in any way directed against the Turkomans of Merv. On this subject, however, the Government of India has been asked for information.

"I have to instruct your Excellency to reply to M. Giers' notes in the sense of the foregoing remarks."

On the 14th February, 1877 (p. 102), M. de Giers stated that the name given in the Cabul Diaries of the reputed Russian Agent was the same as that mentioned by General Kaufmann, but his Excellency said that he was not personally employed by General Kaufmann, nor was he personally known to him. The letter of which he was the bearer had been sent by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Bokhara for transmission to Balkh; from thence it was forwarded to the Ameer at Cabul.

The Agent in question was the mere bearer of a letter, was neither selected by, nor personally known to General Kaufmann, and consequently was in no way authorized to assume the character of a Russian Agent or Envoy at Cabul.

M. de Giers stated that he had sent a copy of the extracts from the Cabul Diaries which I had given him to General Kaufmann, and had observed to him that the assumed character at Cabul of a Russian Envoy by this messenger was incorrect, liable to misconception, and consequently to be guarded against for the future.

On the 5th March (p. 105), M. de Giers returned the following reply to Lord Derby's representations:—

"The Imperial Government entirely share the opinion of the British Government that a frank and cordial interchange of opinions on the question of Central Asia cannot do otherwise than contribute to the maintenance of the good and friendly relations at present established between Russia and England.

"With this view they felt ready to give, in the notes of the ^{19th November} 1st December and the ^{3rd} 15th December, to which your Excellency refers, the assurance that Russia had not endeavoured to conclude any arrangement commercial or political, with the Ameer of Cabul, and that the rare relations of our authorities in Central Asia with the latter had never borne any other character than one of pure courtesy, in conformity with local usages in the East. While now renewing these assurances, the Imperial Government hope the British Government will recognize that practically we have never swerved from them, whatever may have been the erroneous interpretations placed by the native Asiatic Governments on the communications of General Kaufmann, and whatever false importance may have been attributed to the method of transmission adopted by him. Misunderstandings on this subject were nearly inevitable, considering the uncertain character of the native populations of Central Asia, and their inveterate inclination to intrigue; the only effective way, in our opinion, of meeting this danger, lies in the good faith and loyalty which, we are glad to think, will never cease to influence, on either side, any interchange of views between us and the British Cabinet.

"In reply to the desire expressed by Lord Derby to know from what source we derived the information of some movements of Anglo-Indian troops against Swat, the Imperial Government loses no time in informing your Excellency that this information was only based on rumours which reached our authorities in Central Asia, and to which we were far from giving an exaggerated value. The Imperial Government has received, on the other hand, with sincere satisfaction, the assertions contained in your Excellency's note, that no military movement in these countries could be conducted in such a manner as to constitute an infraction of the understanding of 1872 between Russia and England, and that the British Government continue to use their influence with the Ameer of Cabul, with the view of dissuading him, in accordance with the above-mentioned understanding, from any attempt outside of the region assigned to his legitimate action.

"We beg at the same time to recognize, with thanks, the promptitude shown by the British Government in requesting information from the Indian Government respecting any undertakings meditated by the Ameer of Afghanistan in Darwaz, or against the Turkomans of Merv, undertakings with regard to which no indication of a nature to alarm us seems to have reached the Cabinet of London."

On the 12th June (p. 110) the India Office forwarded a despatch from the Viceroy, remarking, with regard to M. de Giers' explanations (p. 111):—

"There can be no doubt that the communications between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali Khan exceed the requirements of mere exchanges of courtesy; and are regarded as something much more than complimentary by the person to whom they are addressed. The messages from General Kaufmann to the Ameer have not been dispatched, as stated by the General (in his letter of the 9th November, 1876, to the Russian Foreign Office), only "once or twice a-year." During the past year they have been incessant. The bearers of them are regarded and treated by the Ameer as Agents of the Russian Government, and on one pretext or another some person recognized by the Afghan Government as a Russian Agent is now almost constantly at Cabul.

"We desire to submit to your Lordship's consideration whether our own conduct would be viewed with indifference by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, were the Government of India to open similarly friendly relations with the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara; and if, without actually making to them overtures of alliance, we addressed to those Princes frequent letters containing assurances of friendship, coupled with explanations of the policy we deem it desirable to pursue towards the States upon our own frontier.

"With regard to Darwaz we have heard of no movement of Afghan troops against, or in the direction of, that Principality, and the high official of the Cabul Government, now present at Peshawur, the Mir Akhor Khan, has likewise heard of none, but a reference has been made to His Highness the Ameer upon the subject, the result of which will be communicated in due course."

Lord Derby instructed Lord A. Loftus on the 19th June (page 113) to convey to the Russian Government the reply of the Viceroy with regard to Darwaz.

On the 17th October, 1877 (page 122), Lord Derby stated to Lord A. Loftus, with reference to some observations of M. de Giers respecting the recent Turkish Mission to Cabul, that, at the request of the Porte, a Turkish Envoy to Afghanistan was allowed to pass through Indian territory, but that Her Majesty's Government had no reason to suppose that the object of his mission was to preach a crusade in Central Asia.

Her Majesty's Government would continue, as they had hitherto done, to use such influence as they possessed with the Ameer of Afghanistan to induce him to maintain peace with Bokhara.

In December 1877 (page 126) a new Russian Envoy belonging to a very high and rich family of Samarcand arrived at Cabul, and was treated with much consideration.

In May 1878 (page 128) eight battalions of infantry reserves were formed for the reinforcement of the Russian troops in the Turkestan military district.

On the 7th June (page 130) the Viceroy reported that news had been received to the effect that the Ameer had been informed by the Russian Agent and by Tashkend Governor-General's letter that an Envoy sent by the Emperor of Russia would shortly visit Cabul as Ambassador, but these reports required verification.

Lord Salisbury directed Lord A. Loftus, on the 16th June (page 131), to endeavour to ascertain whether there was any truth in the report.

At an interview with M. de Giers on the 2nd July (p. 132) Lord A. Loftus inquired of his Excellency whether any Russian Representative was instructed either by the Imperial Government at St. Petersburg or by the Governor-General of Turkestan, to proceed to Cabul.

M. de Giers replied that no such mission had been, or was intended to be, sent to Cabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann.

Lord A. Loftus observed to his Excellency that, for some time past, a Russian Agent had resided at Cabul, and that intrigues had been apparently carrying on with a view to create dissensions between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Indian Government, and stated that this course was not in conformity with the arrangement entered into between the Governments of England and Russia, and that, if it continued, it must inevitably produce results prejudicial to the good relations between the two Governments.

M. de Giers replied that there had been a moment when war appeared to be almost imminent, and that, under those circumstances, no doubt the military commanders conceived it to be their duty to take such measures as might be necessary and serviceable to their country. He denied, however, as far as he was aware, that there had been any intrigues with the Ameer of Cabul of the nature to which Lord A. Loftus had alluded. He admitted that he had sent M. Bakouline, the Russian Consul at Asterabad, to Meshed to watch the movements of Captains Butler and Napier, who were reported to be inciting the Turkoman tribes to hostilities against Russia. This was the only diplomatic measure he had taken.

An order of the day dated Tashkend, published in the "Turkestan Gazette," 26th May (p. 133), directed the formation of three advanced expeditionary detachments.

The first detachment was to be concentrated at Samarcand, and to march from thence *en échelons* to Djam, and further according to instructions.

The second detachment was to be organized at Marghelan, to march through Vuadil to the valley of the Ryzylsu, and further according to instructions.

The third detachment was to be formed at Petro-Alexandrovsk, and to march along the Amu-Daira to Chardjyi, from whence it would advance according to instructions.

The "Moscow Gazette" of the 9th July (p. 135) contained a letter from Tashkend dated the 11th June, announcing the arrival of General Stoletoff.

Reports from India (p. 139) also stated that military preparations were being made by the Russians in Central Asia, and roads being constructed between Khiva and Charjui on the Oxus; also that General Kaufmann had informed the Ameer of Cabul that a Russian European Envoy was about to proceed thither.

On the 8th August (p. 142) the India Office addressed a letter to the Foreign Office recapitulating the declarations made by Russia in regard to Afghanistan, and stating—

"The Russian Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards that State during the same period has been shaped in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence, and, whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been in the interests of peace to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

"It is true that the Russian Government has denied the reality of any such step on its part as that now reported. M. de Giers has formally stated, in fact, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that no such Mission as that referred to by Lord Lytton has been, or was intended to be, sent to Cabul by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann; he has, with equal emphasis, denied the existence of intrigues between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali. But in the face of the particulars now received from India, corroborated as they are from other sources, Viscount Cranbrook cannot pretend to accept as satisfactory these denials.

"Assuming the truth of the fact reported, it appears that, contrary to all engagements with England, a Russian Mission has found its way to the Ameer of Cabul, who has received it, either willingly or under pressure, without reference to the Indian Government. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men, moving through the Turkoman country, and on the line of the Oxus, and converging on points which may be said to directly menace the safety and integrity of Afghanistan.

"To meet this difficulty the Viceroy has proposed, as a preliminary measure, to insist on the reception by the Ameer of a suitable British Mission at Cabul, a proposal which, as will be seen from the telegram quoted in the margin,* the Secretary of State for India has deemed it expedient to sanction.

"But Lord Cranbrook cannot consider this step as adequate in itself to the occasion, and is strongly of opinion that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be at once instructed to address the Russian Cabinet upon the proceedings of the Russian authorities in Turkestan.

"It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India.

"In view of the gravity of the situation the Secretary of State for India may safely leave to Lord Salisbury, who has a full knowledge of the question, the adoption of such language at St. Petersburg as he may think best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect.

"I am directed to add, in conclusion, that Viscount Cranbrook proposes to submit hereafter remarks on the alleged movements of Russian expeditions in the Turkoman country and on the Oxus, which he is of opinion should form the subject of a distinct and separate communication to the Government of Russia."

The letter inclosed the following telegrams from and to the Viceroy (p. 143):—

"British native medical officer, lent some time ago to Ameer, returned on leave to Peshawur on the 21st instant, reporting that Kaufmann, with troops had reached Karki, and was personally proceeding to see Ameer. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending Ameer's orders, but he declined to obey them. Ameer thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers.

"Native doctor heard Ameer tell his Minister in Durbar, 7th July, that Kaufmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Cabul, refusing to be stopped.

"I refrained from telegraphing this information to you pending confirmation. Have now heard from Peshawur reported arrival of Russian officer at Cabul with large military escort. This, of course, cannot be Kaufmann, and may be native of rank in Russian service, though all accounts as yet point to European officer. If such Mission be authenticated I will telegraph again.

"It will be difficult to act or instruct frontier officers without definite indication of views of Cabinet on such conduct on part of Russia and Ameer, having regard to Russia's formal promises, and Ameer's refusal to receive British Mission in any shape. What I shall then require to know, without delay, is, whether this will be treated by Her Majesty's Government as an Imperial question with Russia, or left to us to deal with as a matter between Ameer and the Government of India.

"In the latter case, I shall propose, with your approval, to insist on immediate suitable reception of European British Mission.

"I will communicate with you further on measures which may, in this contingency, become necessary for securing due permanent preponderance in Afghanistan. The alternative would be continued policy of complete inaction, difficult to maintain, and very injurious to our position in India.

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, August 2, 1878.

"FURTHER confirmation received of presence of Russian Mission at Cabul, headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand, who is mentioned by name.

"Referring to my telegram of 30th, we desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honour and are staying at Cabul, within short distance of our frontier, and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there.

"We have further reports of Russian officers having visited, and been well received, at Maimana.

"To remain inactive now will, we respectfully submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly and as completely under Russian power and influence as the Khanates.

"We believe we could correct situation, if allowed to treat it as question between us and Ameer, and probably could do so without recourse to force; but we must speak plainly and decidedly, and be sure of your support.

"It appears to us that the contingency contemplated in Secretary of State's letter of the 2nd January, 1875, has arisen, and we propose, therefore, in the first place to insist on reception of suitable British Mission at Cabul. To this we do not anticipate serious resistance; indeed, we think it probable that Ameer, adhering to his policy of playing Russia and ourselves off against each other, will really welcome such Mission, while outwardly only yielding to pressure. We would thus endeavour to effect arrangements similar to those urged on us by your Lordship's predecessor in despatch above quoted, but avoiding all dynastic obligations.

"It is possible we should find considerable difficulty in obtaining Ameer's assent to such arrangements, but in hands of skillful negotiator difficulties might be overcome, and at least it is desirable to make the effort in the first instance.

"Ameer is aware we are in position to enforce our demands. Failing in these endeavours to re-establish the preponderance of British influence in Afghanistan, which we believe to be necessary for the safety of India, we shall then have to consider what measures are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of our north-west frontier as indicated in last paragraph of Secretary of State's despatch of 4th October, 1877.

"We earnestly solicit an early reply, as situation is urgent."

Viscount Cranbrook to the Viceroy of India.

August 3, 1878.

"Assuming the certainty of Russian officers at Cabul, your proposals to insist on reception of British Envoy approved.

"In case of refusal you will telegraph again as to the steps you desire to take for compelling the Ameer to receive your Mission."

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

"(Telegraphic)

Simla, August 5, 1878.

"Your telegram of 3rd. Cabul. No hostile action shall be taken without full previous communication with you."

On the 9th August (p. 145) the Viceroy telegraphed:—

"Reports from Cabul, July 30th, state Ameer received Russian Envoy in Durbar, 26th.

"Envoy presented two letters, one from Governor-General of Tashkend, other from the Czar. Contents not stated.

"Review of troops ordered for 2nd instant."

On the 13th August (p. 145) the India Office addressed a further letter to the Foreign Office, containing observations on the Russian military preparations in Central Asia, and contrasted the policy pursued by Russia with the assurances

given to the British Government, with especial reference to Prince Gortchakow's communication of the 5th April, 1875. In short the letter remarked—

“Far from the Russian Government adhering to its pledges of 1875, the past three years have been marked by a considerable increase of territory, by expeditions into the Akhal country, by secret Missions of Russian Agents both in the Turkoman country and in Western Afghanistan, and, finally, by the present military movements.

“Lord Cranbrook is not in a position at this moment to indicate what effective steps should, in his opinion, be taken by the Indian Government in the altered situation created by the proceedings of the Russian authorities in Turkestan; but requests Lord Salisbury to keep him informed of any measures which he may adopt to obtain explanations from the Russian Government, and the result.”

On the 14th August (p. 147) Mr. Plunkett reported as follows:—

“Reverting to the explanation which he had given to Lord A. Loftus, that, in view of the probability of a war with Great Britain, the Russian military commanders in Asia had been justified in preparing such measures as they deemed most likely to prejudice Great Britain, I said that peace was now happily secured, and therefore I ventured to inquire what measures had been taken for arresting the march of the Russian columns which had left Tashkend and Krasnovodsk, and whether it was true that the Russian Envoy or Agent was still residing at Cabul.

“After carefully weighing his words his Excellency replied that I must understand that, in questions of military movements, he could not be answerable for the details with which he was naturally not acquainted; he could only answer for the principles which had been laid down for the policy of the Government. He could then assure me that it was not true that any Russian emissary had proceeded to Cabul with any letter from the Emperor to the Ameer. Possibly there might have been a letter from General Kaufmann. Orders had been given to arrest the march of all the columns which had been put in movement from Tashkend, and as a matter of fact he was under the impression, although he could not tell me so either officially or positively, that the troops had already resumed their old stations.

“I then inquired whether the column which had left Krasnovodsk under General Llamakin had also returned; but on this point I failed to elicit any distinct reply.

“I obtained, however, an assurance from M. de Giers, which he repeated to me twice, that all the special measures which had been taken in Central Asia, and which, M. de Giers said, Russia had as much right to take, in view of the impending risk of war, as Great Britain had had to bring Indian troops to Malta, had been stopped; and he asserted positively that at the present moment no military measures whatever were being taken which could give umbrage to Her Majesty's Government.

“I said that I was glad to receive these assurances as regards the stoppage of all military movements; could his Excellency give me equally satisfactory assurances concerning those political steps which had been commenced in view of complications with Great Britain?

“M. de Giers at once replied: ‘Everything has been stopped. The political as well as the military precautions which we thought ourselves justified in taking against you—everything has been stopped.’

“I have full confidence that in the above assurances M. de Giers correctly conveyed to me the substance of the orders sent from here as far as the Cabinet knows them; but he had warned me that he was necessarily ignorant of many military details, and experience has already shown how elastic Imperial orders become by the time they reach Tashkend.”

On the 19th August (p. 149) Lord Salisbury sent an instruction to Mr. Plunkett, in which he recapitulated the occasions on which Prince Gortchakow had disclaimed any intention on the part of the Russian Government to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, and stated—

“The Russian Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards that State has confessedly, and with the concurrence and approval of Russia, been shaped, during the same period, in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence; and, whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been, in the interests of peace, to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

“The Government of Russia have given that of Her Majesty no reason to suppose that they had departed from the line of policy thus indicated. On the contrary, when inquiries were recently made by Lord A. Loftus, as reported in his despatch of the 3rd ultimo, M. de Giers emphatically denied that any such Mission as is now spoken of had been sent, or was intended to be sent, to Cabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann.

“But the circumstantial reports now received from India, corroborated as they are from other sources, are of a nature which it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to ignore or overlook.

“Assuming the truth of the facts reported, it would appear that a Russian Mission has found

its way to the Ameer of Cabul, who has received it, either willingly or under pressure. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men, moving through the Turkoman country and on the line of the Oxus, and so directed that the Ameer may not unnaturally consider them as offering a menace to the safety and integrity of his dominions.

"I must therefore request you to mention these reports to Prince Gortchakow, and to inquire whether there is any foundation for them. You will not conceal from his Highness that proceedings of the kind referred to would cause uneasiness in India and dissatisfaction in this country, and should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from His Highness.

The "Turkestan Gazette" of the 18th August (p. 157) stated that news had been received from the Mission under General Stoletoff, which had reached Haiben, in northern Afghanistan; that it had been well received by the Afghans, and expected to arrive at Cabul on the 3rd August.

The return from Samarcand to Tashkend of General Kaufmann was also announced. It appeared from this that it was General Stoletoff, and not General Abramoff, who had been sent as Russian Envoy to Cabul.

On the 10th September (p. 159), the India Office transmitted an extract from a Confidential news-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated the 18th June, 1878, which stated—

"The following news has been received from an authentic source:—

"The Russian Envoy stationed at Cabul laid before the Ameer the under-mentioned proposals on the part of the Russian Government:—

"1. That the Ameer may permit the location of Russian Agents at Cabul, and at other places in his territory where it may be deemed necessary to locate such Agents of the Russian nationality, and that the Agents should enjoy the powers of Consuls.

"2. That permission be accorded for the quartering of Russian troops at four suitable places on the boundaries of Afghanistan, and that the Ameer should engage to protect those troops.

"3. That the Russian Government be allowed to construct a road from Samarcand to Cabul via Kata Kurghan, Khoja Salih, and Balkh, then from Cabul to Herat via the course of the Hamun River, the plain of Indkho, Bala Murghab, Maruchak, Pandi, and Firoz Koh, and from Herat to Candahar by the Garmsir route.

"4. When necessity arises, the Cabul Government may allow passage, by routes it may be desirable to follow, to Russian troops proceeding to India.

"5. That telegraph wire be set up between Samarcand, Kata Kurghan, Balkh, Cabul, Candahar, and other places where the Russian troops or Agents be stationed.

"6. That when necessary, Russian troops may be supplied with provisions and carriage on payment of reasonable prices.

"7. The Russian Government will allow the continuance of the country of Afghanistan to the representatives, successors, and heirs of the Ameer in perpetuity, in accordance with the will (of the last Sovereign) and legal rights.

"8. That the Russian Government will in no way interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the administration of the country.

"9. That the Russian Government will ever afford proper aid for the maintenance of peace in Afghanistan and to (assistance against ?) the external and internal enemies of the Principality.

"10. The Russian authorities will consider the enemies of the Ameer as their enemies.

"11. That if it becomes desirable that the Russian Government should send an expedition to wage war in India, the Ameer should furnish supplies to the Russian troops on payment; and that the Afghan Government will establish Agents at the capital of Russia, at Tashkend, &c."

The Ameer is said to have replied that he must consult the Grandees of Candahar, Herat, Turkestan, and Badakshan, and that they would have to reply in writing.

It seems that these proposals were made before the arrival of General Stoletoff, and his mission was reported to be intended for their discussion.

M. de Giers being absent, Mr. Plunkett called upon M. Melnikoff (p. 162), on the 6th September, to press for a reply to the request of Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Mission should be withdrawn from Cabul.

M. de Melnikoff promised that he would immediately inform M. de Giers of Mr. Plunkett's wishes. After objecting to Mr. Plunkett's having quoted any extract from the unofficial portion of the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," M. Melnikoff stated that the Foreign Department had not been aware of the dispatch of this Mission; that it had been sent by General Kaufmann, in the exercise of the discretion with which he is invested as Governor-General of Turkestan; and that the Foreign Department often did not know exactly where the Mission might be, except from what it learnt through the Ministry of War.

To this Mr. Plunkett replied that Central Asiatic affairs being directly under the Foreign Department, except in so far as regards military details, he could not accept this explanation, for, even if General Kaufmann had taken upon himself, without permission, such a step as to send a Mission to Afghanistan, the Foreign Department were responsible for the acts of their Agents, and might long ago have directed him to recall it.

On the 13th September (p. 164) Mr. Plunkett forwarded the following note from M. de Giers, dated Livadia, 8th September:—

“I have not until to-day been able to reply to the note you did me the honour to address to me, dated the 4th instant, which reached me during my journey.

“While acknowledging the perfect accuracy of the quotations made in that document, I can only confirm what I have already had the honour of saying to you: that the dispositions of the Imperial Government in regard to the Central Asian question of which those quotations reproduce the expression, have necessarily been affected by the political condition in which we were placed by the attitude of England during the recent crisis in the East. But, under the present circumstances, those dispositions are the same as formerly, and are not of a nature to give rise to any distrust on the part of the English Government.

“I should add that the mission, which you erroneously attribute to General Abramoff, is of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy; it cannot, therefore, interfere in any way with the pacific assurances which you mention.

“I trust that the explanations which M. Bartholomei has already been charged to give to Lord Salisbury on this subject will have sufficiently explained the situation.”

In transmitting copies of Mr. Plunkett's despatch and its inclosure to the India Office, September 20 (page 165), Lord Salisbury remarked that he inferred from M. de Giers' note that his Excellency acknowledged that all the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity.

And on the 30th September (page 165) Lord Salisbury addressed the following despatch to Mr. Plunkett:—

“In the note from M. de Giers of the ^{27th August} ~~5th September~~, of which copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 13th instant, reference is made to explanations which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London had been instructed to offer in regard to the recent proceedings of the Russian authorities in Central Asia.

“The communications made by M. Bartholomei have been generally to the same effect as what has been stated by M. de Giers. He has stated that the military and political measures adopted in Turkestan were actuated by the necessities of the situation caused by the state of affairs in regard to Turkey, and were called forth especially by the attitude of Great Britain towards Russia. General Kaufmann's proceedings, he said, must therefore be regarded as the result of a course imposed upon him by the force of circumstances.

“As I had spoken to M. Bartholomei of a letter from the Emperor which was supposed to have been transmitted to Shere Ali Khan, he asked the Russian Government for information on the point, and subsequently said that he was authorized to state that there had never been any question of sending such a letter.”

This concludes the series of Parliamentary Papers, and brings the diplomatic communications with Russia contained in it up to date.

(Signed)

TENTERDEN.

Foreign Office,
November 30, 1878.

ANNEX (A.)

(Translation.)

Treaty of Peace between Russia and Khiva, proposed by General Aide-de-camp von Kaufmann, commanding the Troops operating against Khiva, and accepted by the Khan of Khiva, Seid Mohamed Rahim Bohadur Khan.

ARTICLE I.

Seid Mohamed Rahim Bodahur Khan acknowledges himself to be the humble servant of the Emperor of All the Russias. He renounces all direct and friendly relations existing with neighbouring Rulers and Khans, and of concluding with them commercial and other Treaties of any kind soever, and binds himself not to undertake any military operation against them without the knowledge and permission of the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

ARTICLE II.

The boundary between the Russian and Khivan territories shall be the Amou-Daria from Kukertli down the river as far as the point at which the most westerly branch of the Amou-Daria leaves the main stream, and from that point the frontier shall pass along such branch as far as its mouth in the Aral Sea. Farther, the frontier shall extend along the sea coast to Cape Urgu, and from thence along the foot of the southern slope of the Ost-Ort, following the so-called ancient bed of the Amou-Daria.

ARTICLE III.

The whole of the right bank of the Amou-Daria, and the lands adjoining thereunto, which have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva, shall pass over from the Khan into the possession of Russia, together with the people dwelling and camping thereon. Those portions of land on the right bank which are at present the property of the Khan, and of which the usufruct has been given by him to Khivan officers of State, become likewise the property of the Russian Government, free of all claims on the part of previous owners. The Khan may indemnify them by grants of land on the left bank.

ARTICLE IV.

In the event of a portion of such right bank being transferred to the possession of the Ameer of Bokhara by the will of His Majesty the Emperor, His Majesty the Khan of Khiva shall recognize the latter as the lawful possessor of such portion of his former dominions, and shall renounce all intentions of re-establishing his authority therein.

ARTICLE V.

Russian steamers and other Russian vessels, whether belonging to the Government or to private individuals, shall have the free and exclusive right of navigating the Amou-Daria River. Khivan and Bokharian vessels may enjoy the same right only by special permission from the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

ARTICLE VI.

Russians shall have the right to construct wharves (landing-places) on the left bank wheresoever the same shall be found necessary and convenient. The Government of the Khan shall be responsible for the safety and maintenance of such wharves. The confirmation of the selection of localities for wharves shall rest with the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

ARTICLE VII.

Independently of such wharves, Russians shall have the right to establish factories on the left bank of the Amou-Daria for the purpose of storing and safe-keeping their merchandize. For the purposes of such factories the Government of the Khan shall allot in the localities which shall have been indicated by the superior Russian authority in Central Asia a sufficient quantity of unoccupied land for the construction of wharves, of storehouses, of buildings for the accommodation of the servants of the factories and of persons transacting business with the factories, and of merchants' offices, as well as for the establishment of agricultural farms. Such factories, together with all persons residing thereat, and with all goods stored therein, shall be under the immediate protection of the Government of the Khan, which shall be responsible for the safety and security of the same.

ARTICLE VIII.

All towns and villages within the Khanate of Khiva shall henceforward be open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and Russian caravans may freely travel throughout the entire Khanate and shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The Government of the Khan shall be responsible for the safety of caravans and warehouses.

ARTICLE IX.

Russian merchants trading in the Khanate shall be free from the payment of Customs duties ("Ziaket") and of all dues on trade, in the same manner as the merchants of Khiva have long enjoyed immunity from "Ziaket" on the route, whether through Kazanlinsk, Orenburg, or the stations (landing-places) on the Caspian Sea.

ARTICLE X.

Russian merchants shall have the right of carrying their goods through the Khivan territory to all neighbouring countries free of Customs duties (free transit trade).

ARTICLE XI.

Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to establish agents (caravan bashis) in Khiva and in the other towns within the Khanate for the purpose of maintaining communication with the local authorities and superintending the regularity of their trade.

ARTICLE XII.

Russian merchants shall have the right to hold real property in the Khanate. A land-tax shall be leviable on the same by agreement with the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

ARTICLE XIII.

Commercial engagements between Russians and Khivans shall be fulfilled inviolably on both sides.

ARTICLE XIV.

The Government of the Khan engages to examine without delay the complaints and claims of Russian subjects against Khivans, and in case such complaints and claims shall prove to be well founded, to give immediate satisfaction in respect to the same. In cases of suits between Russian subjects and Khans, preference shall be given to Russians in respect to the payment of debts by Khivans.

ARTICLE XV.

Complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects shall be referred to the nearest Russian authorities for examination and satisfaction, even in the event of such complaints and claims being raised by Russian subjects within the confines of the Khanate.

ARTICLE XVI.

The Government of the Khan shall in no case give refuge to emigrants (run-aways) from Russia, having no permit from Russian authorities, without regard to the nationality of such individuals. Should any Russian subjects, being criminals, seek shelter within the boundaries of Khiva in order to avoid judicial pursuit, the Government of the Khan engages to capture such persons and to surrender them to the nearest Russian authorities.

ARTICLE XVII.

The Proclamation published by Seid Mohamed Rahim Bohadur Khan on the 14th day of July last, respecting the liberation of all slaves in the Khanate and the abolition in perpetuity of slavery and of trade in men, shall remain in full force, and the Government of the Khan engages to employ all the means in its power in order to watch over the strict and conscientious fulfilment of the clause.

ANNEX (B.)

Treaty between the British Government and Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, concluded on the part of the British Government by Major John Jacob, C.B., in virtue of full Powers granted by the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T., &c., Governor-General of India, and by Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat.

WHEREAS the course of events has made it expedient that a new Agreement should be concluded between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, the following Articles have been agreed on between the said Government and his Highness :—

ARTICLE I.

The Treaty concluded by Major Outram between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, on the 6th October, 1841, is hereby annulled.

ARTICLE II.

There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, his heirs and successors.

ARTICLE III.

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to oppose to the utmost all the enemies of the British Government, in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with that Government, and to enter into no negotiation with other States without its consent, the usual friendly correspondence with neighbours being continued as before.

ARTICLE IV.

Should it be deemed necessary to station British troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities.

ARTICLE V.

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to prevent all plundering or other outrages by his subjects within or near British territory, to protect the passage of merchants to and fro between the British dominions and Afghanistan, whether by way of Sindh, the seaport of Soumeeanee, or other seaports of Mekran, and to permit no exactions to be made beyond an equitable duty, to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, and the amount to be shown in the schedule annexed to this Treaty.

ARTICLE VI.

To aid Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, in the fulfilment of these obligations, and on condition of a faithful performance of them year by year, the British Government binds itself to pay to Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, an annual subsidy of 50,000 Company's rupees.

ARTICLE VII.

If during any year the conditions above mentioned shall not be faithfully performed by the said Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, then the annual subsidy of 50,000 Company's rupees will not be paid by the British Government.

Done at Mustoong this 14th day of May, 1854.

(Signed) JOHN JACOBS, Major,
*Political Superintendent and Commandant on the frontier of
Upper Sindh.*

Mustoong, May 14, 1854.

Schedule showing amount of Duty to be levied on Merchandise passing through the Dominions of the Khan of Khelat, referred to in Article V of this Treaty.

On each camel load, without respect to value, from the northern frontier to the sea, either Kurrachee or other port, six Company's rupees.

On each camel, as above, from the northern frontier to Shikapore, five Company's rupees.
 The same duties to be levied on merchandise passing in the contrary direction from the sea, or from Sindh to the Khelat territory.

(Signed) JOHN JACOBS, *Major,*
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the frontier of
Upper Sindh.

The foregoing Articles of Treaty having been concluded between the British Government and the Khan of Khelat, and signed and sealed by Major John Jacob, C.B., on the one part, and Meer Nusseer Khan on the other, at Mustoong, on the 14th May, A.D. 1854, corresponding with 16th Shaban, A.H. 1270, a copy of the same will be delivered to His Highness, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within two months from this date.


(Signed) DALHOUSIE.
 J. DORIN.
 J. LOW.
 J. P. GRANT.
 B. PEACOCK.

Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, Fort William, this 2nd day of June, 1854.

(Signed) G. F. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government of India.

ANNEX (C.)

[Outline Map showing the principal places referred to.]



Scale of English Stat. Miles
0 50 100 150

55 E. Greenwich

Mailland's Geogr. Establ. London

Supplement to the Analysis by Lord Tenterden of the Papers presented to Parliament respecting Central Asia, 1878.

SINCE the analysis of the Parliamentary Papers respecting Central Asia was prepared, some further papers on the subject have been presented to Parliament—“Central Asia No. 2, 1878.”

The Russian Mission to Cabul.

From the reports received at Peshawur (pp. 1—7, 8—11) it appears that the Russian Mission entered Cabul on the 22nd July, and was received in state, with military salutes. The Envoy (General Stoletoff) had interviews with the Ameer on the 26th and 30th, and a review was held in his honour on the 2nd August.

The Russian Envoy was stated to have left a portion of his escort at each of the stages between Cabul and the Oxus, ostensibly to convey despatches, but really to survey the country.

More detailed accounts of the journey of the Russian Mission, extracted from the “Golos” and “Journal de St. Pétersbourg,” will be found at pp. 23 and 25. These state that the Mission left Samarcand on the 14th June, and proceeded to Karshi, where the Ameer of Bokhara was staying. Thence they traversed a hilly country, reaching the Oxus in five days. They waited three days after reaching the Oxus for the arrival of an Afghan escort. They then reached Schérif in three stages, where, in consequence of the death of the Governor, they were detained a fortnight. It took them twenty days to cross the Hindu Kush and reach Cabul.

According to the “Russki Mir” (p. 11), General Stoletoff left Cabul soon after the review, bringing back with him, at the Ameer’s request, an Afghan Embassy, consisting of the Afghan Minister of the Interior, the Ameer’s Adjutant, two Staff Officers, and a Treasurer. They arrived at Tashkend on the 15th September, and were received by General Kauffman on the 17th. It was said that they were to proceed to St. Petersburg. This account is confirmed by another Russian newspaper, the “Novoe Vremia” (p. 13).

The papers do not show what became of this Afghan Mission.

Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

On the 12th December Sir William Harcourt said in the House of Commons :—

“I beg to give notice that to-morrow I shall ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, when he stated the other day that the Russian Envoy had left Cabul, he intended that the Russian Mission had left Afghanistan, and if he can inform the House as to the state of the case as to the Russian Mission in Afghanistan, and whether it remains there or not.”

The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied :—

“I may be allowed at once to answer that question. At the time that I gave that answer I gave it according to the information which we then possessed. I understood—the Government understood—from what had passed between our Representatives and the Russian Government, that the return of the Envoy from Cabul was equivalent to the recall of the Mission; but we have received quite recently, since this Debate commenced, information which leads us to form an opposite conclusion. We can assure the House that it may be quite certain the Government will not acquiesce, and does not intend to acquiesce, in the exercise of Russian influence in Afghanistan in that or any other form.”

Assurances of Prince Gortchacow.

Lord Augustus Loftus had an interview with Prince Gortchacow at Baden-Baden on the 22nd September (p. 9), and observed to the Prince, with regard to

Afghanistan, that he was returning from a short excursion to Italy, and was consequently without any official information or instructions. He could not, however, refrain from remarking to his Highness that the very fact of sending a Mission to Cabul was, in his opinion, a violation of the compact and engagements which Russia had entered into with England, adding that it was the more incomprehensible to him, inasmuch as on a late occasion, and only a few days before his departure, M. de Giers had expressly denied to him that there had been, or was, any intention, on the part either of the Emperor or of General Kauffman, of sending a Mission to Cabul.

Prince Gortchacow merely repeated that the Mission was one of courtesy, and added that probably M. de Giers, at the moment he gave Lord A. Loftus the assurance, had not been informed of it. Prince Gortchacow observed that it was true that military measures had been devised when a war between England and Russia appeared to be imminent, but that they had been countermanded and the troops recalled. His Highness then explicitly stated that the Imperial Government would maintain their engagement with England in regard to Afghanistan; that they had no wish or object to interpose in the affairs of that kingdom; and that the Ameer of Afghanistan, in the event of war, would receive no assistance either in arms or money from Russia.

The Russian Expeditionary Force in Central Asia.

It was noticed in the previous analysis that a Russian expeditionary force had been formed in Central Asia. From the account given by the correspondent of a Russian newspaper (p. 16), who took part in it, this expedition proceeded by way of Samarcand towards the Bokharian frontier; and after encountering great difficulties from the climate and the natural obstacles of the country traversed, only succeeded in reaching Djam, 48 miles from Samarcand, where it is said to have awaited the result of the Berlin Congress. The expedition seems to have returned in the middle of July, the Treaty of Berlin having been signed on the 13th July. By an order of the day of the 16th August the reserve troops in the military circle of Turkestan were demobilized and certain of the levies dismissed (p. 11). Lord A. Loftus, however, reported that he had learnt that, although disembodied and disarmed, and consequently demobilized, the reserves were still retained and employed in making roads to the Oxus (p. 12).

General Llamakin's Proceedings.

An interesting account was published in the "Moscow Gazette" of the 6th and 9th November (p. 19) of the march of a Russian expedition to Kizzil Arvat, apparently by some one attached to General Llamakin's Staff. The detachment started on the 3rd August, and took the most direct route from Chikislar up the Attrek Valley, the bank of which is for a considerable distance bordered by inaccessible morasses. Having reached the junction of the Sumbar and Attrek, they were compelled by the nature of the country to cross the mountains to Chat, on the Sumbar, whence they made their way to Kizzil Arvat, and thence pushed on until they got within sight of Buirma, in the Akhal Téké country.

From the telegraphic reports from Tehran (p. 8) it seems that the progress of the Russians was arrested here, as they were attacked by the Turkomans, and a caravan of provisions cut off. General Llamakin then retreated to Chikislar, leaving a detachment at Chat with winter supplies (p. 17).

The reports are very confused, and the above account contains all that can be satisfactorily extracted from them.

TENTERDEN.

Foreign Office,
December 23, 1878.
